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FOOD SAFETY AND RISK
GOVERNANCE IN GLOBALIZED
MARKETS
Sandra Hoffmann and William Hardert
INTRODUCTION
Modem food safety policy came into being at the turn of the
twentieth century in response to scandals in the meat-packing and
food-processing industries.' Behind these scandals lay dramatic
changes in the economic structure of food production and distribution.
Rapid technological change was transforming life into something now
recognizable as a modern urban-industrial society. Food production
was shifting away from home or local production and processing to-
ward more industrial processing and regional or even national market-
ing. In the United States, long-distance rail systems and refrigerated
t Sandra Hoffmann is a Fellow with Resources for the Future. William
Harder is a Ph.D. student in Political Science and Public Administration at American
University. We thank Richard Williams (George Mason University) for sharing
insights from his experience with food safety risk analysis and economics at U.S.
FDA.
1 The 1906 Neil-Reynolds report to Congress documents conditions of filth
and lack of sanitation in Chicago stockyards. Among the many unsanitary conditions,
they found workers urinating in the slaughter hall because privies were too far away,
unsanitary privies in areas used for butchering, lack of soap and water for workers,
and meat piled on slimy wooden floors shoveled onto rotting wooden tables for
butchering. Conditions in Chicago Stockyards: Message from the President of the
United States Before the Comm. on Agric., 59th Cong. (1st Sess. 1906) (transmitting
the Report of Mr. James Bronson Reynolds and Commissioner Charles P. Neill,
Special Committee Appointed to Investigate the Conditions in the Stock Yards of
Chicago). Fraud and adulteration of nonmeat foods was also common. A noted food
authority of the time described some of the ways foods were adulterated. Edward A.
Ayers, What the Food Law Saves Us From: Adulterations, Substitutions, Chemical
Dyes, and Other Evils, in 14 THE WORLD'S WORK: A HISTORY OF OUR TIME 9316,
9319 (1910). Milk was watered and then made to look heavier in fat content with
cheaper coloring and caramel. Formaldehyde (a carcinogen) was used to conceal
fermentation. Jellies labeled "pure" were often glucose, artificially flavored and
"jelled" with gelatin rather than fruit jelled with natural pectin as implied by the label
"pure." For a historical perspective on economic and social situations leading to food
safety legislation in the United States in 1906, see generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE
JUNGLE (Viking Press 1950) (1906).
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railcars made possible the rise of a national meat-packing industry,
with primary production across the Great Plains and slaughter and
processing in rail centers such as Kansas City and Chicago. Institu-
tions that had emerged to manage safety risks associated with local
production and distribution were incapable of safeguarding health in
this more nationally integrated economy. Substantial institutional
innovation was needed to manage the resulting changes in health
risks. In 1906, the U.S. Congress passed both the Meat Inspection
Act of 19062 and the Pure Food and Drug Act. 3 In amended form, this
legislation remains the core of U.S. food safety law.4
A new generation of major food safety policy reform is now
emerging. These reforms are also being driven by scandals and crises
of trust: among them, the Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak in the Unit-
ed States that sickened more than 600 and killed four children in Jan-
uary 1993; the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crises in
Britain and Europe; dioxin contamination of Belgian livestock feed;
and adulteration of Chinese food exports with melamine.s As at the
start of the twentieth century, economic and technological transforma-
tions in both food and the food supply system lie behind these more
recent food safety crises. The past three decades have seen both
heightened concentration among food production and marketing firms
and the globalization of food supply chains. Global revolutions in
information and transportation technology have enabled these
changes. Rapid advances in life and materials sciences are giving rise
to novel products and practices whose safety remains unproven in
many consumers' eyes. Governments are struggling to create institu-
tions that can address the implications these changes have for public
health.
At the heart of this new generation of food safety reform is a
growing international consensus on the need for risk-based, scientifi-
cally supported policies that prevent food contamination and food-
2 Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 674.
Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768.
4 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-625 (meat inspection); Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301.
ELISE GOLAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY INNOVATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: EVIDENCE FROM THE MEAT INDUSTRY, AGRIC. ECON. REPORT No.
831, at 10 (2004), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publicationslaer831/; BBC
News, BSE and CJD: Crisis Chronology, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hilenglish/static/in
depth/health/2000/bse/default.stm (last visited May 3, 2010); Ahmed ElAmin,
Belgium, Netherlands Meat Sectors Face Dioxin Crisis (Jan. 31, 2006), http://www
.foodproductiondaily.com/Quality-Safety/Belgium-Netherlands-meat-sectors-face-di
oxin-crisis; Melamine Found in Chinese-Made Food Products, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/world/asia/26iht-milk.4.16516560.html.
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borne illness through integrated risk management from farm-to-table.
As will be discussed, these policies likely will differ from country to
country, but they are being guided by a shared set of principles that
have emerged through several decades of discussion and collaborative
technical work at the national and international levels in both the pub-
lic and private sectors.' Policy reform proposals are being shaped by
worldwide trends toward greater global economic integration, in-
creased reliance on the use of decision and risk analysis in public ad-
ministration, and the spread of total quality management practices in
private industry.
Risk analysis, a set of systematic methods for assessing and man-
aging hazards, provides the core intellectual framework for this food
safety reform movement. The practices of risk analysis in public ad-
ministration have been developed and formalized since the early
1980s to address a diverse range of hazards, from environmental tox-
ins to nuclear power generation to safety in space flights. As dis-
cussed below, risk analysis is conventionally viewed as involving
both the scientific assessment and management of risks.
The central theme of this article is that global coordination of food
safety policy and management is absolutely essential to providing a
safe food supply in an increasingly globalized economy. No country
by itself can ensure the safety of its population's food supply in this
modern economy. Yet at the same time, there is intense concern
about maintaining national sovereignty, particularly because in areas
like food and health risk, there are strong cultural differences across
countries. With United Nations facilitation, a structure for collabora-
tive international technical deliberation has evolved that is providing a
mechanism for food safety policy coordination across countries. This
effort appears to be reasonably successful and may provide a model
of how global coordination of legal institutions could occur in
other policy arenas such as chemical regulation and climate change.
Global coordination of food safety management will necessarily
involve not only collaboration among national governments, but also
the efforts of private industries to ensure the safety of products along
their international supply chains. Management of food safety in a
6 One purpose of this article is to introduce readers to the process through
which this consensus has emerged. For an example of the kinds of efforts involved,
see World Health Org. [WHO], Assuring Food Safety and Quality: Guidelines for
Strengthening National Food Control Systems, http://www.who.int/foodsafety/
publications/fs management/guidelines foodcontrollen/index.html (last visited May
3, 2010) (providing guidance to national governments seeking to strengthen their food
safety control systems).
7 See infra Section II.
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globalized economy requires reliance on both public and private con-
trols. This new generation of food safety policy is rightly embodying
efforts by the public sector to leverage and support private sector safe-
ty management.
Significant advantages flow from having a shared vision of the
basic framework for food safety policy and management. From a
trade law perspective, it enhances legal transparency and in so doing
should help reduce trade disputes. But more important, from a safety
perspective, it should increase the ability of national governments to
ensure the safety of imports. Less obviously, having a shared vision
of the structure of a modem food safety system is allowing govern-
ment officials, industrial managers, food safety engineers, scientists,
and economists in countries around the world, particularly in Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries, to build on each other's efforts. Scientists at the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) are learning lessons from Danish public
health officials about foodborne disease surveillance.' The work of
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) scientists in developing
methods of quantitatively modeling the way microbial hazards enter
and spread in the food supply chain led the way for similar efforts in
Europe and by the World Health Organization (WHO).9 WHO risk
assessments in turn have provided U.S. officials and private sector
food safety managers with a sounder scientific basis for U.S. food
safety policy. Having a common vision of the elements and structure
of this new generation of food safety policy also makes it possible to
develop data and communication systems that can help identify the
emergence of new hazards in the food supply as well as their sources
and transmission, nationally and globally. 0 To the extent that this
shared vision results in a relatively consistent regulatory environment,
it will also facilitate the development and spread of better safety man-
agement practices in production, processing, and distribution of food.
These collaborative efforts should enhance the ability of both gov-
ernment and industry to ensure the safety of food produced domesti-
cally as well as imports.
8 Elaine Scallan, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Attempting to
Apply the Danish Food Attribution Model in the United States (Apr. 26, 2005),
http://www.card.iastate.edu/food-safety/workshop3/presentations/10_danishfood
.htm.
9 For an early discussion of this work, see Robert Buchanan & Bart Suhre,
New Developments in Chemical and Microbial Risk Assessment, in TOWARD SAFER
FOOD: PERSPECTIVES ON RISK AND PRIORITY SETTING 10 (Sandra A. Hoffmann &
Michael R. Taylor eds., 2005).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 160-168, 223.
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I also offer a note of caution. One of the dangers in all manage-
ment systems, whether public or private, is that once policies are
adopted, they are hard to change.' 1 This is a basic problem in domes-
tic law and policy. Greater integration of policy internationally will
increase the difficulty of reversing bad policies once locked in place.12
It also means that locking in bad policies and practices at the national
level are likely to have impacts beyond national boundaries. A fun-
damental challenge for law and public administration in our increa-
singly integrated global economy will be to develop institutional
structures and practices that prevent such lock-in by allowing evolu-
tion of international rules and norms while at the same time adequate-
ly protecting expectations.
We have already seen an example of this problem in the arena of
food safety. An old adage among U.S. lawyers is that "bad facts make
bad law." It takes a very cool head to think clearly in the face of
1 Path dependency of "lock-in" coupled with switching costs has been used
to understand why inefficient or inferior technologies come to dominate markets. W.
Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Histori-
cal Events, 99 EcoN. J. 106 (1989) (a seminal early paper); Joseph Farrell & Paul
Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Net-
work Effects, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 3 (M. Armstrong & R.
Porter eds., 2007) (examining how switching costs prevents customers from shifting
from one product to another, giving early innovators market power). This same para-
digm has also been used to explain "stickiness" in policy evolution. David Wilsford,
Path Dependency, or Why History Makes It Difficult but Not Impossible to Reform
Health Care Systems in a Big Way, 14 J. PUB. POL'Y 251 (1994) (using the concept of
path dependency to examine the dynamics of policy change in health care). The
difficulty the United States has had in consolidating food safety agencies or signifi-
cantly reforming meat inspection can be seen as examples of policy "lock-in" where
there is a high institutional and political cost to switching from one regime to another.
For example, the 1906 Meat Inspection Act led to the emergence of a strong meat
inspectors' union, which has been a vocal supporter for the current inspection system.
See, e.g., Testimony of Stanley Painter, Chairman, Nat'l Joint Council of Food In-
spection Local Unions, AFL-CIO, Before Domestic Policy Subcomm., H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov't Reform (Apr. 17, 2008).
12 To some extent, national legal systems have developed mechanisms to
allow the evolution of law, in response either to changed conditions or to changed
understandings of what constitutes good policy. In the United States and former
British Commonwealth, common law strikes a balance between ensuring stable ex-
pectations by reliance on precedence and providing a means of adjusting rules to
changed circumstances. See JoHN R. COMMoNs, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM
(Univ. Wis. Press 2006) (1924). Legislative bodies provide another mechanism for
changing rules, though the fact that U.S. meat inspection is still governed by 1906
legislation points to the difficulty of changing major legislation. A challenge for
jurisprudence in the coming decades will be developing mechanisms to allow this
kind of adaptation in a world where national legal systems are more tightly integrated
globally.
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"bad facts." The facts surrounding the BSE crisis in the United and
continental Europe were horrific and had profound effects on the de-
velopment of European food safety law reform.'3 Major government
investigations within the United Kingdom and by the European Union
(EU) highlighted the role that the influence of commercial agricultural
interests on government scientific analysis played in prolonging the
BSE crisis and deepening its health impact.14
One impact of this finding has been the adoption of EU food safe-
ty law that rigidly separates risk assessment (scientific analysis of how
risks arise) from risk management (decision-making about how best to
reduce risks). In the process, economics and social sciences, which
are commonly viewed solely as part of risk management rather than
scientific analysis, have also been isolated from scientific assessment
of risk. Yet food safety risks are created by human activities affecting
biological and physical processes. Economics and other behavioral
sciences provide a scientific basis for modeling and measuring beha-
vioral influences on health risks. Isolation of economics and other
behavioral science analysis from risk assessment could lead to less
accurate risk assessment and a weaker scientific foundation for food
safety risk management. With greater global integration, this policy
has the potential to affect not only Europe, but other countries as well,
including the United States.
This paper presents an overview of current food safety problems
and the global risk governance structure that is emerging to manage
these problems. Section I examines food safety as a public health and
economic issue. Section II describes the development of risk analysis
as a regulatory paradigm in the United States and Europe. Section III
discusses globalization and the role of a risk analysis paradigm in the
emerging global framework for this new generation of food safety
policy. Section IV examines regional and national food safety re-
forms in response to crises at both of these levels of government and
articulates how such reforms are being shaped by this global frame-
work. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications
of this history for food safety reform in the United States.
I. RECENT FOOD SAFETY TRENDS
Food safety, particularly infectious foodborne illness, is a signifi-
cant and increasing global health concern." Population-level food-
13 See infra text accompanying notes 138-180.
" See infra text accompanying notes 134, 142-143.
15 See J. Rocourt et al., WHO, The Present State of Foodborne Disease in
OECD Countries (2003), available at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/
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borne disease incidence is quite uncertain as a result of significant
underreporting.' 6  However, the CDC estimates that in the United
States, approximately 76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations,
and 5,000 deaths occur annually from foodborne infections.17
Incidence of foodborne illness is undoubtedly higher in developing
countries, but the statistics are even more uncertain there, with fewer
resources to devote to disease surveillance.'" The WHO estimates that
each year, approximately 2.2 million people in developing countries
die from foodborne and waterborne infectious disease. 9 In addition
to the direct suffering involved, the associated morbidity also drains
20
productivity, imposing an in-kind tax on human energy.
Over the last two to three decades, foodborne infectious disease
has emerged as the primary health concern driving food safety poli-
cy. 2 1 New knowledge about the extent and severity of foodborne in-
fectious disease has driven this focus. Epidemiological data from
countries around the world showed substantial increases in the rate of
foodborne infectious diseases from the 1970s into the 1990s. 22 Public
health scientists are confident that this was not simply the result of
increased investment in disease surveillance, but represented a real
increase in the incidence of foodborne illness.23 Scientists are also
recognizing that foodborne illness may be more serious than previous-
ly thought. New pathogen hazards, such as BSE and shiga-toxin-
producing E. coli, have recently emerged, causing serious health
consequences including organ failure and death. 24 And medical re-
foodbome disease/oecd fbd.pdf; WHO, WHO Global Strategy for Food Safety: Safer
Food for Better Health, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/
publications/generallen/strategy en.pdf.
16 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, FoodNet Surveillance: Burden of
Disease Pyramid, http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet/surveillancejages/burdenpyramid
.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).
17 Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 607, 607 (1999); see POPULATION Div., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, HISTORICAL POPULATION ESTIMATES: JULY 1, 1900 TO JULY 1, 1999,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt (last visited May 3,
2010) (indicating that the U.S. population was approximately 273 million in 1999).
18 See F.K. Kiaferstein et al., Foodborne Disease Control: A Transnational
Challenge, 3 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 503, 506 (1997).
WHO, WHO Global Strategy for Food Safety, supra note 15, at 5.
20 See Food & Agric. Org. [FAO] & WHO, The Role of Food Safety in
Health and Development, 12, WHO Technical Report Series 705 (1984).
21 See WHO, WHO Global Strategy for Food Safety, supra note 15.
22 See id. at 5; see also Kalferstein et al., supra note 18, at 503; Rocourt et al.,
supra note 15, at 8-9 (identifying eight new conditions and practices since the 1970s
that contributed to this increase).
23 See Rocourt et al., supra note 15, at 11.
24 See generally Robert V. Tauxe, Emerging Foodborne Diseases: An Evolv-
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search is showing that acute infections, such as those associated with
foodborne illnesses, can also result in serious chronic diseases, such as
reactive arthritis and kidney and heart disease.25
This focus on foodborne infectious disease also reflects a widely
held view among food scientists and public health officials that chem-
ical hazards have been reasonably well controlled.2 6 Chemical residue
and food additive standards are set with substantial margins of safety
based on the best available scientific models. 27  Compliance with
chemical residue standards, at least in OECD countries, is believed to
be reasonably high. There is little epidemiological evidence of overt
problems. Research continues to monitor and assess the possibility of
more subtle impacts, but epidemiological evidence of such impacts is
more difficult to secure because the effects of doses as low as those
generally found in food residues are subtle or involve long latency
periods between exposure and onset of illness.28
Yet chemical hazards do remain a concern for both consumers
and food safety experts. Continuing consumer concern about pesti-
cide residues has resulted in the development of organic standards and
the growth of organic food as a market sector.29 Public health con-
cerns have focused on the effects of cumulative exposure and impacts
of low doses of foodborne chemicals on sensitive populations. In
1996, the United States passed the first major pesticide legislation
reform in twenty years. This legislation requires EPA to evaluate the
ing Public Health Challenge, 3 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 425 (1997) (provides
the most recent CDC estimates of the incidence of foodborne illness by causal patho-
gen for the United States); see also Josefa M. Rangel et al., Epidemiology of
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Outbreaks, United States, 1982-2002, 11 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 603, 603 (2005); Jill J. McCluskey et al., Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy in Japan: Consumers' Food Safety Perceptions and Willingness to
Pay for Tested Beef 49 AuSTL. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 197, 197-209 (2005)
(discussing the role of British beef exports in Japan to the emergence of BSE in
Japan).
25 See generally James A. Lindsay, Special Issue: Chronic Sequelae of
Foodborne Disease, 3 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 443 (1997).
26 Rocourt et al., supra note 15, at 12.
27 See generally W. H. Van Eck, International Standards: The International
Harmonization of Pesticide Residue Standards for Food and Drinking Water, in
PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN FOOD AND DRINKING WATER: HUMAN EXPOSURE AND RISKS
295 (Denis Hamilton & Stephen Crossley eds., 2004).
28 See generally Les Davies et al., Chronic Intake, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN
FOOD AND DRINKING WATER: HUMAN EXPOSURE AND RISKS 213 (Denis Hamilton &
Stephen Crossley eds., 2004).
29 See generally CAROLYN DIMITRI & CATHERINE GREENE, ECON. RES. SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. INFO. BULL. No. 777, RECENT GROWTH PATTERNS IN THE
U.S. ORGANIC FOODS MARKET (2002) (providing a statistical overview of growth in
organic foods markets in the United States).
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cumulative impact that low-dose exposure to multiple chemicals could
have on adult and child health and to establish standards that would
protect children.3 0 The last three decades have also seen scientific
transformation, first in the life sciences and more recently in materials
sciences.3 1 New technologies - including the development of geneti-
cally modified plants and animals, the use of growth-enhancing
hormones, and the emergence of nanotechnology - have required
evaluation for risk and modification of regulations. In general,
European consumers seem more concerned about the health impacts
of these new technologies than do consumers in the United States.32
Globalization has complicated management of both infectious and
noninfectious foodborne hazards. In many developing countries,
global economic integration has helped raise incomes. But it has also
fostered rapid urbanization, straining sanitation and water systems
needed for safe food handling.33 Rapid urbanization is also accompa-
nied by a shift from home to commercial food production, processing,
and preparation and therefore by a heightened need for training in new
food hygiene management practices. Emerging economies, such as
China, are moving through periods of rapid industrialization and ur-
banization similar to those experienced by Europe and North America
in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the world is seeing the reemergence
30 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489.
See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND
CHILDREN (1993) (assessing differences in the impact of pesticides and children and
adults and assessing the adequacy of existing pesticide regulation to protect infants
and children).
31 See generally Jean D. Kinsey, The New Food Economy: Consumers,
Farms, Pharms, and Science, 83 Am. J. AGRic. EcON. 1113 (2001) (presidential ad-
dress at the 2001 American Agricultural Economics Association Meeting discussing
major trends in food production, marketing, and safety).
32 See, e.g., Simonetta Zarrilli, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, International Trade in GMOs and GM Products: National and Multila-
teral Legal Frameworks, at 39 (2005); Frans W.A. Brom, WTO, Public Reason and
Food Public Reasoning in the 'Trade Conflict' on GM-Food, 7 ETHICAL THEORY &
MORAL PRAC. 417 (2004) (arguing that the conflict between free-trade treaty obliga-
tions and the cultural meanings of food demands greater attention to international
food trade regulations); David Byrne, Eur. Comm'r for Health & Consumer Prot.,
Address at the Food Safety Conference: The Regulation of Food Safety and the Use
of Traceability/Tracing in the EU and USA: Convergence or Divergence? (Mar. 19,
2004), http://ec.europa.euldgs/healthconsumerlibrary/speeches/speechl 68_en.pdf
(explaining the difference between European and American perspectives on food
safety).
3 Kaferstein et al., supra note 18, at 503-04; see also WHO, WHO Global
Strategy for Food Safety, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing the interaction of agricultur-
al, health, and food marketing practices in developing and industrial nations in affect-
ing food safety in each set of countries).
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of problems, such as intentional adulteration of products for economic
gain (economic adulteration), at a level that is reminiscent of the late
1800s. Recent problems with economic adulteration of food exports
from China demonstrate how increased global trade coupled with
weak national food safety institutions and the difficulty of observing
or detecting safety attributes of food create opportunities for consumer
fraud.34 The institutional capacity of industries and governments in
emerging economies needs to grow with their productive capacity.
Industrializing countries should be able to benefit from the lessons
advanced industrial countries learned about building food safety insti-
tutions over the past hundred years.
In almost all countries, globalization has meant more globalized
food supplies. In the United States, fresh fruit imports increased from
nine percent of consumption in 1985 to twenty-three percent in 2001,
and vegetable imports grew from eight percent to seventeen percent.35
Without care, imported foods can also effectively result in the impor-
tation of another country's sanitation problem. The United States
experienced this in a 1996 outbreak of cyclosporiasis associated with
Guatemalan raspberries and a 2008 outbreak of salmonella from Mex-
ican jalapefio peppers. 36 Consumers in developed countries, such as
the United States, tend to view the problem of contaminated food im-
ports as originating solely in developing countries. But the direction
of influences is not so easy to stereotype. For example, the spread of
BSE to Japan and other Asian countries can be traced to British beef
and cattle-feed exports in the 1990s. 37
It is important to recognize that current disease levels reflect past
and current investments in controlling foodborne hazards. In 1999,
Belgian animal feed was accidentally contaminated with dioxin in
34 See generally FRED GALE & DINGHUAN Hu, SUPPLY CHAIN ISSUES IN
CHINA'S MILK ADULTERATION INCIDENT (2009), http://ageconsearch.umn
.edulbitstream/51613/2/China%20Dairy%20industry%/.20IAAE%20 June2009.pdf
(describing underlying economic conditions and institutional structures that contri-
buted to adulteration of Chinese milk with melamine); see also Aleda V. Roth et al.,
Unraveling the Food Supply Chain: Strategic Insights from China and the 2007 Re-
calls, 44 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 22, 22 (discussing the U.S. Food & Drug Adminis-
tration's response to adulteration of Chinese gluten with melamine).
35 ANDY JERARDO, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OUTLOOK REP. No. FAU-79-01,
IMPORT SHARE OF U.S. FOOD CONSUMPTION STABLE AT t 1 PERCENT 5 (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/fau/july03/fau7901/fau7901.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Linda Calvin et al., Case Study: Guatemalan Raspberries and
Cyclospora, in 10 Focus: FOOD SAFETY IN FOOD SECURITY AND FOOD (2003), availa-
bleat http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/focusl0 07.pdf.
n Jill j. McCluskey et al., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Japan:
Consumers' Food Safety Perceptions and Willingness to Pay for Tested Beef, 49
AuSTL. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE EcON. 197, 198 (2005).
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polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and distributed to approximately
2,500 farms.38 In the winter of 2008 to 2009, salmonella originating
from a Georgia peanut processor sickened more than 700 people in
forty-six states.39 That salmonella outbreak was caused by a leaking
roof and poor hygiene conditions that the processing plant failed to
address despite public inspectors' awareness of the problem. These
incidents serve as a reminder that failures in private management and
public enforcement are always possible, even in countries considered
to have strong food safety practices and institutional safeguards.40
They also serve as a reminder that without continued control, old
problems, such as tuberculosis, can reemerge.
II. FOUNDATIONS FOR FOOD SAFETY POLICY
REFORM AROUND THE GLOBE
The 1990s and 2000s saw three major innovations in food safety
policy: expansion of the role of multinational institutions; emergence
of an international consensus around the basic components of a mod-
em structure for food safety policy; and national-level reform of food
safety law. These innovations embody broader policy agendas that
have roots going back almost half a century that coalesced in the face
of recent food safety crises. These agendas include introduction
of scientific management practices into public administration, particu-
larly since the 1960s; adoption of total quality management as a con-
ceptual framework for process engineering in the United States and
Europe, again particularly since the 1960s; and a continued commit-
ment to global integration of markets since World War II.
A. Science-Based Public Decision Analysis
In both the private and public sectors, the post-World War II pe-
riod has been characterized by a drive for greater rationalization in
decision-making, particularly risk management and decision-making
under uncertainty. 41 Food safety management and policy have at
times led and at times benefited from this drive.
3 See ElAmin, supra note 5.
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't Health & Human Servs.,
Investigation Update: Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium Infections, 2008-2009
(Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/typhimurium/update.html.
4 See generally Adrian Covaci et al., The Belgian PCB/Dioxin Crisis-8
Years Later: An Overview, 25 ENvTL. ToxICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 164 (2008).
41 Two threads have emerged as particularly central to policy: rationalized
risk management as a paradigm for public governance of health, safety, and environ-
mental hazards and processing engineering controls systems to food processing. See
152010]
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Food safety policy is among the oldest areas of modem consumer
safety. In the United States, federal agencies have a long history of
applying risk analysis to guide public decisions. Much as we are see-
ing a revolution in life sciences today, the 1940s and 1950s were a
period of revolutionary development in applied chemistry. One such
area of application was food additives. In 1954, Lehman and Fitz-
hugh suggested the use of safety factors to establish acceptable daily
intake of food additives on the basis of acute toxicity.4 2 A safety fac-
tor approach to risk assessment is still used in setting food standards
today. 43 Lehman-Fitzhugh's model included a safety threshold below
which chemicals are assumed to have no effect. Controversy about
whether such a threshold exists for carcinogens led to a 1958 amend-
ment to the Food, Drugs, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, known as the
Delaney Clause. This legislation effectively prohibited sale in the
United States of foods that contained additives shown to be carcino-
genic." As the analytical ability to detect residues increased, argu-
ments about the appropriateness of the Delaney Clause's nonthreshold
model grew. In 1973, the FDA abandoned the nonthreshold dose-
response model for carcinogens after concluding that there was inade-
quate scientific basis for this modeling assumption.45
In 1981, public controversy over FDA's abandonment of the use
of the nonthreshold model prompted the U.S. Congress to call for a
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee to evaluate the merit
of creating an independent institution to conduct risk assessments for
Richard N.L. Andrews, Risk-Based Decision Making: Policy, Science, and Politics, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 215-38 (Norman Vig &
Michael Kraft eds., 2006) (discussing the role of decision analysis and risk manage-
ment in U.S. environmental policy); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC CRITERIA
To ENSURE SAFE FOOD 70 (2003). From an economics perspective, both fit into the
legacy of von Newman and Morgenstern in the rich literature on expected utility
theory and rationalizing decision-making under uncertainty. JOHN VON NEUMANN &
OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). For a
general introduction to the academic and management literature on decision-making
under uncertainty, see ROBERT T. CLEMEN, MAKING HARD DECISIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO DECISION ANALYSIS (1996).
42 See A.J. Lehman & O.G. Fitzhugh, 100-Fold Margin of Safety, 18 Q.
BULL. Ass'N FOOD & DRUG OFFICIALS U.S. 33, 33-35 (1954) (providing early scientif-
ic justification for FDA's hundredfold margin of safety for chemical residues in
food).
43 See, e.g., CODEx ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, CODEX GENERAL STANDARD FOR
FOOD ADDITIVES: CODEx STAN 192-1995 (2009), http://www.codexalimentarius.net/
gsfaonline/CXS 192e.pdf.
44 Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, §409, 72 Stat.
1784, 2151-52 (amended 1964).
45 See Robert J. Scheuplein, Risk Assessment and Food Safety: A Scientist's
and Regulator's View, 42 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 237, 240 (1987).
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all federal agencies. 46 The study summarized practices federal agen-
cies were developing to use scientific analysis of risks to assess and
manage risks. It described risk analysis as a three-part process: risk
assessment, risk management, and risk communication.47 Although
the committee recommended separating the risk assessment and risk
management functions to protect the integrity of the scientific analy-
sis, it did not recommend creating an independent risk assessment
institution. The study, dubbed the "Red Book" because of its cover
color, quickly became the "bible" of risk analysis for federal agencies.
It is difficult to overstate the influence of the NAS Red Book. It
is still looked to as the basic framework for risk regulation by both
U.S. agencies and governments around the world. Its publication and
use have stimulated discussion about the role of risk analysis in go-
vernance of consumer and environmental risk in Europe as well as in
the United States. 4 8 As will be seen, the Red Book has had direct in-
fluence on the shape of international food safety policy and national
policy worldwide.
Since publication of the Red Book, risk analysis has played a cen-
tral role in U.S. environmental policy administration. In the 1980s,
the White House sought to exert control over the agendas of U.S.
health and safety agencies through Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) oversight. Andrews argues that risk analysis gave regulatory
agencies, particularly the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a
way to shift OMB's cost-benefit analysis toward science-based, out-
come-focused analysis. 49 In the 1980s and 1990s, the EPA experi-
46 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 2 (1983).
47 Risk assessment is the scientific evaluation of the level of risk faced by a
population of concern. It typically involves assessment, dose-response, and risk
characterization. Risk management is regulation or policy decision-making. Risk
communication focuses on communicating results not only to the public, but also
among policy circles. Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Produc-
tion & Inspection: Risk Analysis, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/factsheets/Risk Analysis/
index.asp (last visited May 3, 2010).
48 See Marion Dreyer & Ortwin Renn, The Scientific Approach to Comparing
Institutional Rearrangements in European Food Safety Governance, in FOOD SAFETY
REGULATION IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Ellen Vos &
Frank Wendler eds., 2006); see also CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCI., TECH., & GOV'T,
RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING (1993).
For an insightful comparison of risk regulatory systems in the United States and Eu-
rope, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Com-
parison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 207
(2003).
49 RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1999); see also
2010] 17
mented with comparative risk ranking projects to help inform agency
priority setting.so OMB and what was then called the General
Accounting Office (GAO) encouraged "other agencies to use compar-
ative risk assessment coupled with a goal of risk reduction to set
budget priorities."5' In the end, the EPA concluded that available risk
information was simply too coarse for budgeting purposes and the
agency's priorities too constrained by legislative mandate. 5 2 Although
comparative risk ranking did not fulfill its promise as a budgeting
tool, it is helpful in finding useful applications to the narrower prob-
lems of prioritization in food safety policy. 3
Comparative risk ranking to inform priority setting has more criti-
cal limitations, however. In particular, used alone it ignores the rela-
tive cost-effectiveness of alternative control options. It also ignores
the way citizens feel about different risks, about reducing one risk
relative to another, and about reducing health risks relative to other
outcomes they want to achieve. A parallel set of public administration
reforms beginning in the 1960s sought to address these issues through
the introduction of modern financial management practices from the
private sector into public administration. The United States saw an
acceleration in use of quantitative policy analysis by federal agencies
following Robert McNamara's introduction of systems analysis, such
as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), as a
Andrews, supra note 41. For a history of the use of risk analysis and cost-benefit
analysis at U.S. EPA, see LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, RISK ANALYSIS AND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, CRS REPORT 94-961, available at
http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-5.cfm (last visited May 3, 2010).
50 See F. Henry Habicht 11, EPA's Vision for Setting National Environmental
Priorities, in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 35-36 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994);
Richard A. Minard Jr., CRA and the States: History, Politics, and Results, in
COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: TOOLS FOR SETTING GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES
27-33 (J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996). U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED
BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES (1987); U.S.
ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
5I 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41 at 1796 (Feb. 8, 1991).
52 id.
53 See RISK ASSESSMENT Div., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FSIS RISK ASSESSMENT
FOR RISK-BASED VERIFICATION SAMPLING OF LISTERIA MONOCYTOGENES (2007); U.S.
GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED COUNTRIES' SYSTEMS CAN
OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND RESPONDING TO FOODBORNE
ILLNESS 15 (2008) [hereinafter FOOD SAFETY] (describing various countries' use of
risk ranking in setting import inspection priorities). For a general set of recommenda-
tions on the role risk ranking could play in food safety policy, see TOWARD SAFER
FOOD: PERSPECTIVES ON RISK AND PRIORITY SETTING 10 (Sandra A. Hoffmann &
Michael R. Taylor eds., 2005) [hereinafter TOWARD SAFER FOOD].
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means of rationalizing strategic planning efforts by the Department of
Defense in the 1960s. In the 1970s, use of analysis that incorporated
consideration of costs, impact, and social preferences increased as
New Society programs were implemented and expanded.5 4  Since
the Reagan administration, cost-benefit analysis has been required
for all major environmental and health and safety regulation."5 The
Government Performance Results Act of 1993 required performance-
based budgeting of all U.S. agencies. 56 Other OECD countries require
similar decision analysis in public decision-making. 7
B. Risk-Based Industrial Process Management
First-generation food safety policy relied heavily on line
inspection to ensure product quality. In the United States, the Meat
Inspection Act of 1906 required continuous visual inspection of meat
slaughter and processing lines. Line inspection reflects industrial
quality management practices of the early 1900s. This was an effec-
tive means of enforcing hygiene practices and detecting visible signs
of diseases, such as trichinosis or tuberculosis. But one hundred years
later, it remains law even though current safety problems, primarily
microbiological and chemical, cannot be detected through visual line
inspection. 9
54 Kaifeng Yang, Quantitative Methods for Policy Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS: THEORY, POLITICS AND METHODS 349-53 (Frank Fischer,
Gerald Miller and Mara Sidney eds., 2007).
5s Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
56 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), amended by
Exec Order No. 13258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 28, 2002), amended by Exec. Order
No. 13422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 23, 2007) (creating a legal requirement for feder-
al agencies to conduct regulatory impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis of
major federal regulations); Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-62, §§ 1115-1116, 107 Stat. 285, 287-88 (requiring federal agencies to
conduct formal strategic planning and annual agency-wide performance reviews).
5 See, e.g., HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND
EVALUATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (2003); see also Treasury Bd. of Can. Secre-
tariat, Regulatory Affairs: Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation, http://www
.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ri-qr/directive/directive00-eng.asp (last visited May 3, 2010) (providing
guidance on the conduct of regulatory impact analysis in the United Kingdom and
Canada, respectively). For a review of performance-based budgeting practices in
OECD countries, see Aidan Ros, Results-Oriented Budget Practice, in OECD
COUNTRIES OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER 209 http://www.odi
.org.uk/resources/download/1 377.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010).
58 Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 674-679 (1906) (current
version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2006)).
5 See Meat Safety: Inspectors' Ability to Detect Harmful Bacteria is Li-
mited: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research, Conservation, Fore-
stry, and General Legislation of the Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry,
192010])
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Even by the 1930s, manufacturers were replacing line inspection
with more analytical quality control methods such as statistical batch
sampling to improve the efficiency of inspection.60  During World
War II, the U.S. military began developing analytical management
processes, such as failure mode and criticality analysis, to assess the
reliability of equipment and procedures and to prevent failures.6' Af-
ter the war, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) further developed these processes to prevent costly failures
in rocket programs, where failures in small batches could fail a mis-
sion. In its various forms, failure and criticality analysis were part of
the broader postwar movement in industrial engineering toward re-
liance on total quality control systems.6 2 In the late 1950s, NASA
asked Pillsbury, a major U.S. food-processing firm, to adapt these
techniques for use in developing food products that met the very high
safety reliability needs of manned space flight. This request resulted
in a process for food application called Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point (HACCP) systems.63
HACCP provides a systematic way to identify foodborne hazards,
assess their criticality, and control weak points through which they are
most likely to enter a food production system. The process begins
with a hazard analysis that develops a detailed description of the food,
its physical and biological properties, its intended use and consumers,
and a verified flow diagram of the process and inputs used to produce
and distribute the food.M HACCP has been promoted as providing
103rd Cong. 1-3 (1994) (statement of John W. Harman, Director of Food and Agri-
cultural Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division of the
U.S. General Accounting Office). Based on personal observation of food safety
reform debates over the past decade and discussions with senior food safety officials,
there appear to be multiple reasons why line inspection has not been abandoned.
Among them are resistance from a well-established inspectors union and a lack of
certainty about what would happen if the continuous inspection requirement were
removed.
6 See generally W. A. SHEWHART, ECONOMIC CONTROL OF QUALITY OF
MANUFACTURED PRODUCT (1931) (foundational work on statistical quality control by
an early leader of Bell Telephone Laboratories).
61 DEP'T OF DEF., PROCEDURE FOR PERFORMING A FAILURE MODE EFFECT AND
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS MIL-P-1629 (1949).
62 See generally Junji Noguchi, The Legacy of W. Edwards Deming, 28
QUALITY PROGRESS 35, 35-37 (1995) (discussing W. Edwards Deming's role in estab-
lishing total quality control systems as central to industrial quality management in
Japan and the United States).
63 For a historical overview, see Karen L. Hulebak & Wayne Schlosser,
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HA CCP) History and Conceptual Over-
view, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 547 (2002).
6 Nat'l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Guide-
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firms with the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, because its
standard is whether a functional control system is in place and the
system under control, rather than the mandated use of specific con-
trols, as was typical under conventional hygiene regulations. It also
provides firms with the flexibility to respond to changing relative
prices and control hazards more cost-effectively.
Like other forms of failure and criticality analysis, HACCP
gained wide adherence in industry and public health circles as an ef-
fective way to prevent system failure. This has been particularly true
in the area of controlling microbiological hazards. HACCP found
fairly quick acceptance among national governments and international
institutions. 5 In 1993, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex)
issued HACCP guidelines and included it in its Recommended Inter-
national Code of Practice in 1995. Shortly thereafter, U.S. food
safety agencies began to shift to the use of HACCP as their basic reg-
ulatory approach for controlling microbial hazards.67
HACCP has received a more mixed response from the food indus-
try and consumers. For large firms, it fits fairly naturally with other
industrial engineering management practices. But HACCP requires
relatively sophisticated administration and management, and it there-
fore can impose a significant burden on smaller firms in the food in-
dustry. In the United States, federal agencies have responded to small
firms' concerns with technical assistance programs.68 U.S. consumer
groups have generally supported HACCP but insist that without en-
forceable performance standards, it provides no way to hold industry
accountable for producing safe food. 6 9 The scientific community is
actively engaged in research to develop such standards.70
lines (Aug. 14, 1997), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/HazardAnalysisCritical
ControlPointsHACCP/ucml 14868.htm.
65 TowARD SAFER FOOD, supra note 53, at 12.
Laurian Unnevehr & Helen Jensen, The Economic Implications of Using
HACCP as a Food Safety Regulatory Standard, 24 FOOD POLICY 625 (1999).
67 See infra text accompanying note 233.
68 FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FSIS
MICROBIOLOGICAL HAZARD IDENTIFICATION GUIDE FOR MEAT AND POULTRY
COMPONENTS OF PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY VERY SMALL PLANTS (1999),
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Frame/FrameRedirect.asp?main=http://www.fsis.usda.gov/
OA/haccp/hidguide.htm.
69 See MICHAEL F. JACOBSON, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST,
COMMISSIONER'S CONSUMER ROUNDTABLE (2000), http://www.goodnutrition.org/
reports/mjcomments cfsan.html.
70 See INST. OF MED., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC CRITERIA TO
ENSURE SAFE FOOD (2003); CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, PRINCIPLES FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT AND APPLICATION OF MICROBIOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR FOODS,
CAC/GL 21 (1997), available at www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/
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III. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND THE RISE OF
INTERNATIONAL FOOD SAFETY GOVERNANCE
Broader government commitments to greater economic integra-
tion, both globally and regionally, have had, and will continue to
have, significant impact on food safety policy. The General Agree-
ment on Trades and Tariffs (GATT), negotiated in the wake of World
War II, remains the central framework for international trade. Since
1947, GATT's goal has been to liberalize trade through successive
rounds of negotiation guided by the principles of equal treatment for
trading partners, transforming nontariff barriers to tariffs, and nego-
tiating reduced tariffs over time." GATT recognizes limited excep-
tions to its general requirements. One of the most important is the
exception for actions required to protect health, under which parties to
the agreement may adopt laws "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant health" as long as they are "not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade." 72
The Uruguay Round of negotiations (1986-1994) created a per-
manent institutional home for GATT within the WTO. An updated
version of the 1947 agreement remains the core of the new GATT
1994.74 More critical for food safety, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
(SPS) Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round to pro-
vide a basis for distinguishing legitimate from protectionist use of
75
safety and phytosanitary laws and to encourage their legitimate use.
The agreement, effective as of 1994, is one of roughly sixty that WTO
signatories have ratified.
394/CXG_021e.pdf.
71 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. Nontariff barriers to trade are barriers to trade that are not in the
form of a tariff. They include things such as subsidies to domestic industries, import
quotas, and standards that differentially impact foreign suppliers.
72 Id art. XX.
7 WHO, Understanding the WTO: Basics, The Uruguay Round, http://www
.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/factS e.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).
74 id.
75 See WHO, Food Safety and Globalization of Trade in Food: A Challenge
to the Public Health Sector, at 1, WHO[FSFIFOS/97.8 Rev. 1 (1998), available at
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/fsmanagement/en/globalization.pdf.
This is not dissimilar to the role played by risk assessment and regulatory impact
assessment in development of U.S. law. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) also adopted in the Uruguay Round, governs all other technical require-
ments and standards, including labeling, not covered by the SPS Agreement. Id.
76 For a general treatise on international trade law, see PETER VAN DEN
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While reiterating commitment to the health exception to GATT,
the SPS Agreement seeks to provide greater certainty about when
national sanitary and phytosanitary laws comply with GATT and to
reduce their impact on trade by promoting harmonized laws.77 Mem
ber states agree "to ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure
is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health" 78 and that measures are "based on scientific prin-
ciples" and supported by "sufficient scientific evidence."79 Measures
may not "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between members"
under "identical or similar conditions"80 and may not be more trade-
restrictive than needed to achieve the member state's "acceptable
risk" level.81
Under the SPS Agreement, signatories agree to base their national
measures on international standards, where they exist. 82  National
rules that conform to international standards are viewed as complying
with the SPS and GATT agreements.83  Signatories are free to set a
higher level of protection than could be achieved based on interna-
tional norms or adopt national norms where no international ones exist
as long as they provide scientific justification or find it appropriate
based on a risk assessment consistent with SPS guidelines. Annex A
BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES
AND MATERIALS (2005); see also PETER GALLAGHER, THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE
WTO: 1995-2005, at 7 (2005) (commissioned by the WTO to provide a factual ac-
count of the transition from the GATT to the WTO). For a well-designed empirical
evaluation of the influence of individual countries on Codex and the influence of
Codex on national food safety law, see DIAHANNA LYNCH PosT, FOOD FIGHTS: WHO
SHAPES INTERNATIONAL FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS AND WHO USES THEM (2005); see
also TIM JOSLING ET AL., FOOD REGULATION AND TRADE: TOWARD A SAFE AND OPEN
GLOBAL SYSTEM 40-51 (examining the interaction between international trade and
food safety policy goals from a political economy perspective). For an accessible but
comprehensive treatment of European Union Food Law, see BERND VAN DER MEULEN
& MENNO VAN DER VELDE, EUROPEAN FOOD LAW HANDBOOK 467-81 (2008) (This
work assumes no prior understanding of European Union law and is a very accessible
entry point into this area of law for those new to law or to EU law. It is also complete
enough to serve as a good reference book for those with substantial knowledge of the
area.).
77 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Attachment to Annex 5, art. 2.1, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round,
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
78 Id. at art. 3.1.
7 Id. at art. 2.2.
so Id. at art. 2.3.
81 Id. at art. 2.6, Annex A.5.
82 Id. at art. 3.1.
83 Id. at art. 3.2.
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of the SPS Agreement defines international standards, guidelines, and
recommendations for food safety as those established by Codex.8
Under the SPS Agreement, members agree to follow risk assessment
principles adopted by relevant international organizations.85  These
assessments must take available scientific evidence into account.
They may also consider economic factors, including "potential
damage in terms of loss of product or sales in the event of the entry,
establishment, or spread of a pest or disease; the cost of control or
eradication in the territory of importing members; [and] the relative
cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches."
Like other GATT provisions, the SPS Agreement is enforced by
international dispute resolution and, if necessary, trade sanctions le-
vied by injured countries against offending ones. A country may
refuse entry of products that do not meet the standards it imposes on
its own industries as long as those standards are consistent with
GATT. SPS signatories also agree to accept the food safety rules of
other nations as equivalent to their own if the exporting country de-
monstrates that its rules can achieve the same level of protection as
the importing members' rules. 8 7
The SPS Agreement is intended to make it easier for all countries
to participate in international trade by creating greater certainty about
when food safety rules comply with GATT and promoting harmoniza-
tion of rules. It recognizes, however, that compliance with these rules
may make it more difficult for developing countries to be involved in
international trade, and thus it encourages wealthier members to pro-
vide or fund technical assistance88 to help poorer countries develop
food safety systems that comply with the SPS Agreement and to grant
time extensions to poorer countries for compliance with SPS obliga-
89tions.
A. The Evolving Role of Codex Alimentarius
The Codex Alimentarius Commission was established in 1961 by
the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
World Health Organization (WHO) to provide a forum for intema-
8 Id. at art. 2.6, Annex A.5.
81 Id. at art. 5.1.
86 Id. at art. 5.3.
87 Id. at art. 4.
88 Id. at art. 9.
89 Id. at art. 10.3.
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tional technical collaboration on the development of food safety and
quality standards.90
The commission was created with two primary goals: protecting
human health and promoting fair trade practices. 91 It pursues both by
serving as a venue for development of mutually agreed upon model
standards, principles, and guidelines that provide guidance to national
92
governments for use in developing their own laws and guidelines.
The recognition of Codex norms as presumptively compliant with
the GATT under the SPS Agreement is likely to give the Codex
Commission greater weight in future national regulatory and legisla-
tive development. 9 3 Although Codex norms are not binding on na-
tions, they have become the standard against which national laws are
measured.
Codex Commission membership is open to nations that are mem-
bers or associate members of the WHO and FAO.94 Other countries,9
international nongovernmental organizations, and other individuals
and organizations, may participate as observers. At any one time,
roughly 175 countries, representing approximately ninety-eight per-
cent of the world's population, participate in Codex.97
The Codex Commission works through a system of technical sub-
ject matter committees and regional subcommittees. These commit-
tees work to prepare and revise draft standards through a formal
procedure of iterative review by the commission and member gov-
ernments. 9* Under its procedural rules, the Codex Commission is
committed to decision by consensus, with majority vote as a last
resort.99
Much of the Codex Commission's and committees' efforts have
gone into producing model standards. These include commodity
standards aimed at preventing consumer fraud, quantitative standards
90 FAO & WHO, UNDERSTANDING THE CODEx ALIMENTARIUS (3rd ed. 2006).
For a brief article explaining the structure and work of Codex, see Eddie Kimbrell,
What Is Codex? 3 AGBIOFORUM 197-202 (2000).
91 FAO & WHO, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION PROCEDURAL MANUAL
§ I, art. 1(a), at 4 (18th ed. 2008).
92 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 473.
93 POST, supra note 76.
94 FAO & WHO, supra note 91, at 4.
95 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 472.
96 FAO & WHO, supra note 91, at 4.
9 Id. at 20.
98 Id. at 28.
9 Id. Final decisions on adoption of standards, principles, and guidelines are
made by the commission. Some standards may be relevant only to particular regions
or a smaller set of nations. In these cases, only these member states may vote. Id.
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for food additives, and quantitative tolerances for contaminants such
as pesticides and veterinary drugs. The commission has also devel-
oped a set of recommended practices referred to as codes of practice
or guidelines. These include guidelines for HACCP systems and an
international food hygiene code.'00 The Codex Commission has
adopted "more than 200 standards, close to 50 food hygiene and tech-
nological codes of practice, some 60 guidelines, over 1,000 food addi-
tives and contaminants evaluations and over 3,200 maximum residue
limits for pesticides and veterinary drugs."io'
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Codex Commission began to
look to risk analysis as a basic framework for developing standards
and guidance.1 02 The influence of the NAS 1983 Red Book is evident.
Codex embodies the Red Book structure of viewing risk analysis as
involving risk assessment, risk management, and risk communica-
tion.10 3  Codex defines risk assessment as a "scientifically based"
process involving four steps: hazard identification, hazard characteri-
zation, exposure assessment, and risk characterization.""0 Risk man-
agement is defined as "the process, distinct from risk assessment, of
weighing policy alternatives, in consultation with all interested par-
ties, considering risk assessment and other factors relevant for the
health protection of consumers and for the promotion of fair trade
practices, and, if needed, selecting appropriate prevention and control
options."' 05 Under Codex, risk communication is focused on commu-
nications among all interested parties during the risk analysis process
"about risk, risk-related factors and risk perceptions., 06
Codex guidelines recommend that food safety regulatory deci-
sions be guided by risk assessment. Risk assessment should be based
on science, using quantitative data to the greatest extent possible, and
documented transparently. The guidelines also recommend that risk
" See Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, Recommended International Code of
Practice: General Principles of Food Hygiene, CAC/RCP 1-1969, Rev. 3, in FOOD
HYGIENE BASIC TEXTS 1-32 (1997); Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Point (HACCP) System and Guidelines for Its Application, An-
nex to CAC/RCP 1-1969, Rev. 3, in FOOD HYGIENE BASIC TEXTS 33-45 (1997).
101 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 473.
102 FAO & WHO, supra note 91, at 171-73. Codex guidance on use of risk
analysis by the commission and its subcommittees was greatly expanded in 2003,
with the addition of a set of "Working Principles for Risk Analysis," and further
elaborated with provisions for applying risk analysis to specific areas of work in
2007, with a statement of principles concerning science the extent to which other
factors are taken into account. Id. at 67-108.
103 Id. at 68.
04 Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
05 Id.
106Id.
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assessment and risk management be functionally separated "to protect
the scientific integrity of the risk assessment."10 7 The Codex Com-
mission itself adheres to this separation. The Codex Commission and
its subsidiary bodies have risk management responsibility. Joint
FAO/WHO expert bodies conduct risk assessments. 08  But Codex
guidelines also recognize that some interaction between risk manage-
ment and risk assessment is necessary from a pragmatic perspec-
tive. 0 9
The purpose of risk assessment is to provide a quantitative or
qualitative estimate of the probability and severity of adverse health
effects in a population of concern."o Under Codex guidelines, risk
assessments should be based on a comprehensive treatment of all
scientific data, whether quantitative or qualitative. They should also
take into account "relevant production, storage and handling practices
used throughout the food chain including traditional practices, me-
thods of analysis, sampling and inspection and the prevalence of spe-
cific adverse health effects.""' Risk assessments should also be based
on realistic exposure scenarios. The guidelines specifically mention
that, where relevant to a particular policy decision, exposure scenarios
consider impacts on susceptible and high-risk population groups, as
well as acute, chronic, and cumulative or combined health impacts.11 2
Similarly, conditions and data from different parts of the world, in-
cluding developing countries, should be included in risk assessments
where relevant." 3
Under Codex procedures, risk management decisions are to be
based on risk assessments. While they may consider legitimate fac-
tors relevant to the promotion of fair practices in food trade, their pri-
mary objective should be consumer health protection.1 4 "Unjustified
differences in the level of consumer health protection to address simi-
lar risks in different situations should be avoided."' 15 Risk manage-
ment decisions should also "take into account relevant production,
storage and handling practices used throughout the food chain includ-
ing traditional practices, methods of analysis, sampling and inspec-
107 Id at 69. The Codex guidelines leave it to member states to determine
how to separate risk assessment and risk management.
10 Id. at 68.
109 Id.
o1 Id. at 73 (defining risk characterization).
Id. at 70.
112 id.
113 id.
114 Id. at 71.
"' Id. at 70.
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tion, feasibility of enforcement and compliance, and the prevalence of
specific adverse health effects.""'6 Codex sees food safety risk man-
agement as an adaptive management process, explicitly noting the
need to revise decisions and standards over time in light of new
data.117
Codex guidelines on risk analysis were strongly influenced by the
role the politicization of science played in Europe's BSE scandals. To
avoid this kind of political influence, Codex guidelines recommend
limiting interaction between risk managers and risk assessors and seek
to make such interactions as transparent as possible. Risk managers
are responsible for defining the scope and purpose of the particular
risk assessment and the form of outputs needed from the risk assess-
ment.11' They may also ask risk assessors "to evaluate the potential
changes in risk resulting from different risk management options."l" 9
These provisions have the potential to affect the contribution
economic analyses can make to food safety policy. Codex standards
are a model for national standards, and the Codex guidelines on risk
analysis are being looked to as a model for the role of risk analysis in
national policy analysis. Economics is generally viewed by noneco-
nomists involved in risk analysis as part of risk management and not
risk assessment. But risks are created by human behavior in a physi-
cal and biological environment, and economics is a behavioral science
that has long been used to look at how humans create and react to risk.
As a result, economic analysis has the potential to make important
contributions to risk assessment as distinct from its role in risk man-
agement. For example, it plays a role in exposure assessment in esti-
mation of food consumption or could make significant contributions
to sensitivity analysis by modeling how firms might change their in-
put use in response to changing technology options or market condi-
tions. Other social sciences have similar roles to play. If separating
risk management from risk assessment leads to isolating economic
and other social sciences from "scientific" analysis, less accurate es-
timates of health risks may result. 20 At the same time, as Williams
and Thompson point out, the "scientific" rather than managerial role
116 Id. at 71.
1" Id. at 72.
"' Id. at 69.
119 Id.
120 See generally Richard A. Williams & Kimberly M. Thompson, Integrated
Analysis: Combining Risk and Economic Assessments While Preserving the Separa-
tion of Powers, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1613 (2004).
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of social science analysis also needs protection from political pres-
sure, just as "hard" science analysis does. 12 1
The Codex Commission's contributions to raising the standard of
food safety globally are often underappreciated. Negotiations over
Codex standards and guidance allow nations to develop a common
understanding, vocabulary, and frame of reference. But perhaps the
most important harmonizing influence of Codex has been the devel-
opment of a strong international community of technical experts on
food and food safety. This is an explicit goal of Codex, which it fos-
ters by sponsoring global and regional conferences to provide national
food safety regulators with less formal opportunities for regular di-
alog.12 2 In part as a result of Codex, international cooperation and
scientific consultation are the norm in food safety technical circles.
Codex meetings provide a stable forum for discussion of technical
issues, and Codex procedures encourage work toward consensus on
best practices. Those discussions would influence the direction of
national policy development even if an international standard is not
adopted. In their treatise on European food law, van der Meulen and
van der Velde describe how these discussions affect lawyers involved
in Codex, but the same is true for scientists, and this may have an
even deeper influence on national policy because of the importance of
technical expertise in the development of food safety policy.12 3 In a
well-documented dissertation, Post finds evidence that where Codex
acts before nations develop standards, such as in HACCP and micro-
bial risk assessment, it has played a significant role in shaping nation-
al policy, but in areas where it acts after national rules have already
been established, it has less influence.124 The new status of Codex
under the SPS Agreement seems likely to result in greater politiciza-
121 id
122 "Conferences such as the first Global Forum of Food Safety Regulators
(GF-1) (Marrakesh, January 2002) and the Pan-European Conference on Food Safety
and Quality (Budapest, February 2002) provide an opportunity for food safety regula-
tors in developed and developing countries to exchange information and experiences
on food safety management, and to foster partnership alliances in support of capacity
building. They help foster harmonization of ideas and creation of natural and sustain-
able networks amongst regulators and their systems." FAO, 124th Sess., Rome, Con-
vening of Global and Regional Meetings of Food Safety Regulators (June 23-28,
2003), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/006/Y9332e.HTM. As
an example of the kind of discussions held at these meetings, see FAO & WHO, Final
Report of the FAQ/WHO Regional Conference on Food Safety for Asia and the Pacif-
ic (May 24-27, 2004), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/008/ad911e/
ad911 eOO.htm.
123 See generally VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 472-
80 (discussing the legal force of Codex standards).
124 See generally POST, supra note 76.
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tion of the Codex process. How this will affect the usefulness of
Codex as a forum for discussion and development of new concepts
remains an open question.
IV. REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES
TO FOOD SAFETY CRISES
A. EU Reform
From the formation of the European Community in 1958 to the
mid-1990s, European food law focused on reducing barriers to the
creation of an integrated internal market for foods. 125 The BSE and
other food safety crises of the mid- to late 1990s changed this focus to
one on maintaining public confidence in the safety of the food
supply.' 26 The BSE crisis created public pressure on European gov-
ernments for wholesale reform of food safety law in Europe and influ-
enced the character of that reform.'12  Because of the timing and the
European states' influence in international trade negotiations, the BSE
crisis likewise affected Codex norms and, through them, will influ-
ence food safety policy globally into the future.128
125 From the 1960s through 1970s, a central question for European food law
was how to control the barriers to internal trade created by the diversity of national
requirements on food content and safety. The first approach tried was creation of
uniform European standards on food content and identity, somewhat like Codex stan-
dards on food content or American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) tech-
nical standards on products such as machine screws. This approach, sometimes re-
ferred to as "vertical" or "positive" harmonization, proved infeasible for use in Euro-
pean food markets because of the simple number and diversity of food products, and
also culturally unacceptable because of diversity of food cultures across Europe. See
VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 230-31; see also Alberto Ale-
manno, Food Safety and the Single European Market, in WHAT'S THE BEEF?: THE
CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 237 (Christopher Ansell &
David Vogel eds., 2006) (offering an insightful perspective on the evolution of Euro-
pean food law). A series of European Court of Justice Cases in the 1970s created a
new way forward. These culminated with the introduction of the principle of mutual
recognition in Cassis de Dion. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung flr Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649. Under the principle of
mutual recognition, European Community states may not refuse entry of products
produced and marketed in compliance with the law of another member state simply
on the grounds that they do not comply with the law of the state refusing entry. As
one commenter put it, "In essence, the Court's rule was that, within the context of the
common market, what is good enough for consumers in one member state is good for
consumers across the Community." VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note
76, at 230-31.
126 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 229.
127 DEBRA HOLLAND & HELEN POPE, EU FOOD LAW AND POLICY 173 (2004).
128 See FAO & WHO, supra note 91, at 71.
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The nature of BSE and the way both national and EU authorities
managed the crisis had a significant impact on subsequent EU re-
forms. 129 BSE is a fatal, neurodegenerative disease caused by prions,
a newly identified disease agent.13 0 BSE was first identified in UK
cattle in 1986.131
Transmission among cattle was traced to the practice of feeding
them animal offal and bone meal as a protein supplement.1 32 Britain
banned this practice in 1988.133 By the time of its ban, the feeding
practices were so widespread in the United Kingdom that they led to
an epidemic with more than 180,000 diseased animals by 2004.134
An official UK inquiry into the British government's handling of
the BSE epidemic concluded that the government had misled the pub-
lic for many years through a campaign of reassurance downplaying
human health risks in order to prevent panic and protect the British
beef industry.135  The report found that the British government had
relied heavily on a 1989 study that hypothesized that BSE in cattle
was related to the disease scrapie in sheep.136 Because scrapie has
never been found to be transmissible to humans, the British govern-
ment assumed that BSE also was not transmissible to humans. 13 7
At a European level, as long as BSE remained solely an animal
disease, the European Commission (EC) was required to act under the
advice of the Standing Veterinary Committee (SVC) which was
dominated by scientists appointed by the British government. Even
though scientific evidence began to suggest that BSE was being
129 Ellen Vos, EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis,
23 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 227 (2000) (arguing that the BSE crisis marked a watershed in
European food safety law and shaped the structure of reforms that followed it).
130 BSE is caused by a prion, a form of protein that physically interacts with
proteins in the host, deforming the way they fold. Prions and the mechanism through
which they cause disease were only identified in the 1990s. See Stanley B. Prusiner,
Molecular Biology ofPrion Diseases, 252 SCIENCE 1515, 1515 (1991).
131 See SEBASTIAN KRAPHOL, RISK REGULATION IN THE SINGLE MARKET 126-
36 (2008).
132 Tom Buerkle, U.K. Understated 'Mad Cow' ThreatReport Calls Officials
to Task For Having Misled the Public, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 27, 2000.
133 The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Order, No. 1039 (1988) (Eng.).
134 HOLLAND & POPE, supra note 127, at 173.
135 NICHOLAS PHILLIPS, THE BSE INQUIRY: RETURN TO AN ORDER OF THE
HONOURABLE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DATED OCTOBER 2000 FOR THE REPORT,
EVIDENCE AND SUPPORTING PAPERS OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE EMERGENCE AND
IDENTIFICATION OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (2000). For a summary
see Buerkle, supra note 132.
136 Buerkle, supra note 132; see also Ortega Medina Report, infra note 143.
137 Buerkle, supra note 132.
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transmitted to humans,'18 the government continued to maintain that
this was not the case until, in March 1996, it announced that the best
explanation for new variant cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD), which caused brain deterioration and death in humans, was
exposure to beef from cattle infected with BSE. Public confidence in
the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) plum-
meted.13 9  Many people, including those in scientific and political
circles, believed that the MAFF did not seek out or take seriously ex-
ternal scientific expertise on the relationship between BSE and human
disease because it was also responsible for promoting agriculture.140
By the mid-1990s, many individual European governments were ban-
ning importation of British beef.141 Yet at an EC meeting held on
March 25, 1996, the SVC maintained that existing regulations were
adequate to control the disease.14 2 At the EC's insistence, however,
the SVC finally voted to ban export of cattle and cattle products from
the United Kingdom at the same meeting. In July 1996, the EU Par-
liament formed a Committee of Enquiry, which presented its report in
early 1997 and found that the structure of EU food safety governance
that allowed domination of decisions by a single member state, politi-
cization of science, and lack of transparency all contributed to the
inability of the EU to respond to the crisis quickly.14 3
The Committee of Enquiry report demonstrated the need for
reform of Europe's food safety policy structure. Subsequent food
1 KRAPHOL, supra note 131, at 127-29. For details regarding the association
between animal feed and BSE, see Buerkle, supra note 132.
13 "The conclusions presented to the British government by the SEAC
prompted the announcement made by the British Health Secretary, on March 20,
1996. His speech before the House of Commons sent shockwaves throughout the
world when he announced that there may exist a link between BSE and an apparent
new strain of CJD. Media reaction to this news was widespread and at times hysteri-
cal causing beef purchases and consumption to plummet. Although there were earlier
scares, none had the devastating effect of the recent one." FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., BSE ROCKS THE EU BEEF SECTOR (1996), http://www.fas.usda
.gov/dlp2/circular/1996/96-1 1/bse.html.
140 On May 16, 1990, British Secretary of State John Gummer appeared on
British television eating a hamburger with his young daughter in an effort to assure
the public of the safety of British beef. John Gummer: Beef Eater, BBC NEWS, Oct.
11, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/369625.stm.
141 John Darnton, British BeefSales Plunge as Germany and Italy Join Import
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/23/
world/british-beef-sales-plunge-as-germany-and-italy-join-import-ban.html.
142 KRAPHOL, supra note 131, at 129.
143 Report on Alleged Contraventions or Maladministration in the Implemen-
tation of Community Law in Relation to BSE, Without Prejudice to the Jurisdiction of
the Community and National Courts, A4-0020/97/A (Feb. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Orte-
ga Medina Report].
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safety crises, including increased incidence of verotoxin-producing E.
coli (VTEC) in European meat and dairy products, continuing public
concern about genetically modified food, and black markets for die-
thylstilbestrol (DES) as a feed additive, all contributed to pressure for
immediate action.'" The response to dioxin contamination of feed in
Belgium in 2000 demonstrated the need for better and faster commu-
nication about food crises among European national food authori-
ties.14 5 Recommendations for structural change followed quickly in
the form of a Green Paper in April 1997 and a White Paper on food
safety in January 2000.146
The White Paper lays out the EC's vision for reform of European
food safety law and is a guide to subsequent legislative action.
In writing it, the EC was driven by a need to "re-establish public
confidence in its food supply."1 4 7  The experience with BSE and
subsequent animal feed crises created a focus on food safety policy
extending from farm-to-table as a means of assuring that every link in
the food supply chain protects consumer health. The EC was guided
by five central principles: clearly defined food safety responsibilities
for all actors in the food supply chain; traceability of food, feeds, and
food ingredients to their sources; transparency and separation of
scientific analysis from risk management to reduce the role of influ-
ence or corruption in food safety policy decisions; risk analysis as the
framework for science-based policy; and the precautionary principle
to guide risk management.148 Although the consumer's role in ensur-
ing food safety was noted, the emphasis was placed on the production
144 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 238-39, 239 n.188-
92; HOLLAND & POPE, supra note 127, at 173.
145 RAYMOND O'ROURKE, EUROPEAN FOOD LAW 9 (2005).
146 Green papers are discussion papers published by the Commission on a
specific policy area. Primarily, they are documents addressed to interested parties -
organizations and individuals - who are invited to participate in a process of consulta-
tion and debate. In some cases, they provide an impetus for subsequent legislation.
See Commission Green Paper on the General Principles of Food Law in the Euro-
pean Union, COM (1997) 176 final (Apr. 30, 1997), http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/
9704/pl03042.htm. In contrast, white papers are documents containing proposals for
Community action in a specific area. They sometimes follow a green paper published
to launch a consultation process at European level. Whereas green papers set out a
range of ideas presented for public discussion and debate, white papers contain an
official set of proposals in specific policy areas and are used as vehicles for their
development. Commission White Paper on Food Safety, COM (1999) 719 final (Jan.
12, 2000), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/1999/coml999_0719enO1
.pdf.
147 Commission White Paper on Food Safety, supra note 146.
148 Bente Halkier & Lotte Holm, Shifting Responsibilities for Food Safety in
Europe: An Introduction, 47 APPETITE 127, 128 (2006).
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and marketing side of the food supply chain. To avoid the politiciza-
tion of science such as that which contributed to the BSE crisis, the
White Paper placed responsibility for risk assessment and science
advice with a new European Food Safety Authority and for risk man-
agement with the EC. In addition, the White Paper included a sche-
dule for prompt consideration of eighty-four legislative and policy
initiatives. The goals of this massive reform were, first, to update
European food law and make it more coherent and comprehensive,
and second, to strengthen enforcement and make it more consistent
across countries.149
Ultimately, the decision to limit the European Food Safety
Authority's function to providing scientific advice may have been
driven by a broader concern about the democratic accountability of
EU institutions and EC Treaty provisions that place legislative
and management powers in the European Commission, European
Parliament, and European Council. But concern for democratic ac-
countability does not explain the White Paper's recommendation to
separate risk assessment from risk management under European food
safety law. This requirement is clearly related to protecting the integ-
rity of scientific analysis and restoring public confidence in food safe-
ty governance.150
In subsequent years, the EC enacted most of the legislative agenda
recommended in the White Paper, much in the form of regulations
rather than directives.15' In January 2002, the European Parliament
and Council adopted Regulation 178/2002, the General Food Law
(GFL). As a regulation, it was immediately binding on all EU mem-
ber states.15 2 Compared with its predecessors, the GFL places greater
emphasis on horizontal regulations, which set general principles ap-
149 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 244-45.Iso See, e.g., Marion Dreyer et al., Institutional Re-Arrangements in European
Food Safety Governance: A Comparative Perspective, in FOOD SAFETY REGULATION
IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 9, 16 (Ellen Vos & Frank
Wendler eds., 2006).
'' Under the EC Treaty, "[a] regulation shall have general application. It
shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable to all Member States." In con-
trast, "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of
form and methods." Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 321) art. 249.
152 Under the EC Treaty, "a regulation shall have general application. It shall
be binding in its entirety and directly applicable to all Member States." In contrast,
"A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieve, upon each member state
to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods." See id.
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plicable to all foodstuffs, rather than on vertical regulations governing
specific products. 5 3
It also makes greater use of regulations that set objectives to be
achieved rather than govern the means of achieving them and relies
less on directives resulting in greater centralization of food safety au-
thority.154 The GFL lays out basic principles to guide subsequent Eu-
ropean food safety legislation and established the European Food
Safety Authority and the Rapid Alert System. The system developed
under the GFL is a three-legged stool resting on an integrated farm-to-
table system of food safety responsibilities and enforcement, a modern
system of monitoring and communication that allows for rapid action
if problems arise, and protection of the integrity of scientific analysis
on which policy decisions rely. Like the SPS Agreement, which was
negotiated at the same time, the GFL seeks to implement a farm-to-
table, preventive system of food safety policy based on scientific data
and risk analysis. The law requires use of HACCP plans to make cer-
tain that preventive controls are used."' The GFL's goal is to ensure
"a high level of protection of human health and consumers' interests
in relation to food." These interests include employing fair trade prac-
tices, maintaining the diversity of European food supply, including
traditional products, promoting an integrated European market, and
preventing fraud, adulteration, and deceptive practices. 56
The GFL provides one example of what a farm-to-table approach
to food safety control can look like. "Food and feed business opera-
tors at all stages of production, processing and distribution" are re-
sponsible for compliance with food law, including the GFL require-
ment that "food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe."l5 7 i
determining whether food is unsafe, enforcement agencies and the
European Community Court should take into account "normal condi-
tions of production, processing and distribution and use," as well as
"information on the label, or other information generally available to
the consumer concerning the avoidance of specific adverse health
153 Foreign Agric. Serv., U.S. Mission to the European Union, Harmonization
of Food Law in the European Union, http://www.fas.usda.gov/posthome/useu/
harmonization.html (last visited May 3, 2010). By 2007, the EU had adopted regula-
tions on GMOs, food hygiene, and food contact materials, as well as rules for coordi-
nation of food safety law enforcement across Europe. The EC is currently working
on modernization of food labeling, pesticides, and food additive legislation, and on
legislation to govern novel foods. Dreyer & Renn, supra note 48, at 250 diagram 7.7.
154 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 249 n.216.
155 Regulation 178/2002, art. 14, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1, 14 (EC).
116 Id. at 1, 9, 12, 13.
15 Id. at 1, 14, 16.
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effects from a particular food or category of foods."'18 Food is unsafe
if it causes short- or long-term health effects to either the consumer or
subsequent generations, taking into account "probable cumulative
toxic effects" and the health sensitivities of subpopulations if the food
is marketed specifically to certain subpopulations, such as infants.
The GFL establishes an EU-wide integrated system of monitoring
and enforcement. Although business operators have the primary re-
sponsibility to keep unsafe food out of the market, national govern-
ments are responsible for creating and maintaining the inspection and
enforcement systems needed to ensure compliance with EU law, both
for domestic production, processing, and marketing and for imports.15 9
The EU Food and Veterinary Office audits food safety systems in
both EU member states and countries that export to the EU.160 Food
businesses are required to inform relevant authorities of the existence
of their establishments and to cooperate with those authorities.161 If
food or feed operators have reason to doubt the safety of food or feed,
they must withdraw the product from the market, and if it has already
reach consumers, the operators must inform the affected consumers
and recall the unsafe product. 16 2 The general public is also to have
access to information on the product recalled, the nature of the risk,
and the control measures taken. 163
A core element of the new law is traceability of foods and sharing
of information on potential hazards across Europe. All food and feed
businesses must have the ability to trace their products one step for-
ward and back in the supply chain and to inform their national food
authority if they have reason to believe that they have put unsafe food
into the market.' 6 A centralized EU-level tracking system - Trace
Control and Expert System (TRACES) - tracks the movement of li-
vestock in the EU from origin to slaughter. 165 Regulation 178/2002
15 Id. at 1, 14.
19 Id. at 1, 16.
160 FOOD SAFETY, supra note 53, at 15.
161 Commission Regulation 852/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 226) 3, 8 (EC).
162 Regulation 178/2002, supra note 155, at 1, 16, 17. Canada also makes
product recall mandatory. See FOOD SAFETY, supra note 53, at 28. Compare with the
United States, where the FDA has voluntary, not mandatory, recall authority. Al-
though many countries have mandatory recall authority, it has seldom been necessary
to use it, because the knowledge that it could be used has generally been enough to
secure cooperation of businesses with food authorities. Id.
163 HOLLAND & POPE, supra note 127, at 30. The United States has a similar
system of posting information on product recalls on the U.S. FDA website. FDA,
RECALLS, MARKET WITHDRAWS, & SAFETY ALERTS, http://www.fda.gov/safety/
recalls/default.htm (last visited May. 3, 2010).
164 Regulation 178/2002, supra note 155, at 1, 16.
165 See FOOD SAFETY, supra note 53, at 50-51.
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establishes a Europe-wide Rapid Alert System, a communication net-
work managed by the European Food Safety Authority responsible for
disseminating information about serious threats to health from food or
feed to all EU member states. To prevent circumvention of import
controls, when a European port of entry refuses entry of a shipment of
food, it is also required to notify all other European ports of entry of
the refusal.166 The system quickly proved its effectiveness in contri-
buting to the rapid control of chloramphenicol in honey in 2004.167
The GFL is explicit that "food law shall be based on risk analy-
sis." 168 Political and food industry influence on scientific analysis in
Britain was at the bottom of the BSE scandal and the resulting crisis
in public confidence. To protect risk analysis from political influence,
the GFL institutionally separates responsibility for risk assessment
and risk management and even separates the responsible bodies geo-
graphically. Article 22 of the GFL creates the European Food Safety
Agency (EFSA) as an independent entity responsible for providing
scientific advice, risk assessment, and technical support for policy.
EFSA is headquartered in Parma, Italy. Risk management decisions
are the domain of the European Commission, European Parliament,
and European Council. These bodies, as well as member states, may
ask the EFSA for a scientific opinion. The EFSA may also initiate
investigations and analyses on its own initiative.' 6 9 Scientific integri-
ty is further guarded by requirements for disclosure of conflicts of
interest by scientists working with the EFSA and by requirements of
public meetings and timely publication of agendas, minutes, and opi-
nions.17 0 The EFSA has eight core responsibilities: providing scientif-
ic opinions; identifying and addressing divergent scientific opinions,
particularly among European and national food safety agencies; pro-
viding scientific and technical assistance at the request of the Euro-
pean Commission and member states; independently commissioning
scientific studies needed to perform its mission; developing systems to
monitor emerging risks and collect relevant data assessing the preva-
lence of foodborne hazards; facilitating scientific cooperation related
to food safety risk assessment in the EU; promoting communication
and networking among European organizations relevant to risk as-
'6 See id. at 53.
167 Michael Durham, A Bitter Taste of Honey, GUARDIAN, July 21, 2004, at
16, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2004/jul/21/food.foodanddrink (last
visited May 3, 2010).
168 Regulation 178/2002, supra note 155, at 1, 12.
169 HOLLAND & POPE, supra note 127, at 29.
170 Regulation 178/2002, supra note 155, at 1, 28.
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sessment, particularly to exposure and the prevalence of hazards; and
contributing to risk communication for consumers.
The EFSA is governed by a management board of fourteen mem-
bers appointed by the European Council in consultation with the Eu-
ropean Parliament from a list the European Commission proposes.
Four of the members must have experience working for organizations
that represent consumers or other interests in the food chain. The
board reviews and approves the EFSA's work program and budget
each year to ensure that it carries out its legislative mission. An
executive director appointed by the board from a list of candidates
proposed by the Commission is responsible for administering the
EFSA. The executive director works with the Commission to develop
a proposed EFSA work program and is assisted by an advisory forum
of representatives of science agencies from member states. The advi-
sory forum is intended to promote communication across Europe,
avoid duplication of scientific effort, and better identify emerging
issues. Panels of independent scientific experts are responsible for
providing the scientific opinions of the EFSA.' 7 ' A scientific commit-
tee, made up of the chairs of the scientific panels and six independent
scientific experts not on any of the panels, is responsible for the coor-
dination needed to ensure consistency in work procedures across the
panels.172
Finally, risk management decisions reached by the European
Commission, Parliament, Council, and member states are to take into
account the results of risk assessments and scientific advice, but may
also consider factors such as societal, economic, traditional, ethical,
and environmental concerns, as well as the feasibility of controls.
Where a risk assessment has been conducted and scientific uncertainty
persists because of inadequate data, the precautionary principle may
be invoked by challengers, and provisional measures may ultimately
be taken to protect public health pending more complete scientific
information. 7 3
The EFSA is not the final arbiter of scientific opinion in the EU,
but it is expected to play an increasingly central role. It is also antic-
ipated that conflict will arise over scientific judgment between the
EFSA and member states. National governments are engaged in
scientific analysis and risk analysis as well. The EFSA has responsi-
bility for maintaining communication among these bodies and identi-
171 Id. at 1, 22-24.
172 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 207-08.
173 Regulation 178/2002, supra note 155, at 1, 12-13.
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fying divergence in scientific opinion. 174 It remains to be seen how
the European Community courts will treat EFSA scientific opinions.
In Pfizer Animal Health, the EC court ruled that, though national food
safety authorities are not required to seek out an EFSA scientific
opinion in developing national rules, they are required to take into
account existing EFSA risk assessments. 175 The GFL also creates a
general obligation on the part of firms to ensure that the food they
market is safe.176 Under Article 14(1), marketing of unsafe food is
therefore both a breach of an implied warranty of safety and a breach
of general product liability law. 7 7 National courts are not obliged to
consult the EFSA in deciding cases brought to enforce this provision,
but they are likely to look to its scientific opinion in reaching their
opinions. Alemanno, author of a leading treatise on European food
safety law, argues that the courts would likely view an EFSA opinion
that a product or practice is unsafe as creating a strong presumption
against safety. 78
Each EU member state is responsible for disease surveillance and
outbreak response within its own borders, for informing the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) of outbreaks that
may affect other member states, and for cooperating with other mem-
ber states and EU-level offices in responding to multicountry out-
breaks. The ECDC manages Enter-net, a computerized international
intestinal (enteric) disease surveillance network. All EU member
states, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and
Japan participate in this network. 179
Will this system work for Europe? Several studies have examined
the European food safety policy reform movement of the 1990s from
the perspectives of law, political science, public administration, and
sociology. 80 They conclude that the system is likely to result in con-
flicts in scientific opinion. But given Europe's diversity in culinary
culture, it allows for diversity of judgment about what constitutes ac-
ceptable risk. As Alemanno writes:
A claim by a domestic food authority that a certain good is
safe or unsafe is likely to involve not only an assertion about
174 Id. at 1, 25.
175 See Alemanno, supra note 125, at 251.
176 Regulation 178/2002, supra note 155, at 1, 14-15.
177 Id.
178 See Alemanno, supra note 125, at 251.
17 See FOOD SAFETY, supra note 53, at 56.
Iso Halkier & Holm, supra note 148; ALBERTO ALEMANNO, TRADE IN FOOD:
REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES IN THE EC AND THE WTO (2007); and VAN
DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76.
2010] 39
HEALTH MA TRL V
science, but also the willingness of this country to bear or not
bear the level of risk considered acceptable in order to contin-
ue or reject a certain local tradition. In contrast, the assertion
made at the EC level about the safety of a product to be
marketed throughout the EU is both a claim about its risk
component and a political claim aimed at favoring economic
integration and free trade within Europe. 81
Alemanno maintains that it is appropriate that the European courts and
not the EFSA resolve conflicts arising between national and EFSA
scientific opinion.1 8 2
Van der Meulen and van der Velde have examined EFSA opi-
nions and concluded that they all have been related to narrow deci-
sions on particular products or food safety targets.18 3 In their view,
risk assessment is informing administrative decisions rather than poli-
cy direction. They argue that the institutional isolation of risk assess-
ment and scientific analysis from risk management may actually result
in risk assessments being less central to risk management or food
safety policy decisions.184 Yet in certain instances, European policy
appears to be risk-based. For example, member states base the inten-
sity of their import inspections on the inherent riskiness of the product
being imported. Factors that come into play in their determination of
product risk include the nature of the food (e.g., whether it is of ani-
mal or nonanimal origin), the quantity imported, and the sanitary and
phytosanitary conditions in the area from which it is imported.18 5
B. National Responses
National governments of many OECD nations have undergone
major food safety legislative reform since the 1990s.' 86 Within the
EU, individual countries responded both to the BSE crisis and to EU-
level reforms.' Reforms in Australia, Canada, Denmark, and New
181 Alemanno, supra note 125, at 254.
182 See id.
183 VAN DER MEULEN & VAN DER VELDE, supra note 76, at 269.
184 id.
185 See generally FOOD SAFETY, supra note 53, at 6, 11.
186 The U.S. Government Accountability Office recently reviewed these
reform efforts to help inform congressional deliberations on import safety and reor-
ganization of federal food safety authority in the United States. Id. at 2-3.
187 Vos and Wendler report on an extensive multi-institutional effort to pro-
vide an empirical comparison of institutional reform efforts in five European coun-
tries: Hungary, Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. See FOOD
SAFETY REGULATION IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Ellen
Vos & Frank Wendler eds., 2006).
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Zealand were largely motivated by a desire to enhance the efficiency
of public administration by eliminating overlapping authorities, focus-
ing resources on high-risk areas, and redressing inconsistencies in
enforcement. 8 8 New Zealand's reform was part of a reorganization of
the entire government in an effort to increase efficiency and enhance
its competitiveness in world trade. 189
Preventive controls were one of the earliest elements of the cur-
rent generation of food safety policy to be adopted. The commitment
to prevention includes a general principle that policy should aim to
prevent foodborne illness rather than responding to it and containing
its damage. It also includes a specific reliance on HACCP plans as
a preventive management tool. This reliance on HACCP is seen its
central role in CODEX food codes since 1995.190 By the mid-1990s,
the European Union was requiring food companies to operate under
HACCP plans.191 The United States promulgated mandatory HACCP
regulations for seafood, meat and poultry, and juice processing at the
same time. New Zealand, Australia, and Canada were also early
adopters of HACCP.192 FAO, through Codex regional committees,
has been working with developing countries to encourage adoption of
appropriate HACCP policies.' 93
EU member states are under treaty obligation to bring their laws
into conformance with the General Food Law and related directives.
But the GFL gives member states latitude in how they implement
EU obligations. A few examples provide a sense of how EU member
states are adapting GFL requirements to their national governance
structures.
In the United Kingdom, BSE created a profound crisis in confi-
dence in national food safety policy.194 UK government investiga-
tions pointed to the dominance of agricultural interests, lack of go-
vernmental transparency, and fragmentation of food safety responsi-
bility among multiple agencies as key factors in the crisis.'95 In 2000,
food safety authority was consolidated under an independent agency,
the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA). The FSA is also the United
188 See generally FOOD SAFETY, supra note 53, at 10 tbl.1.
189 id
190 See supra text accompanying note 66.
' Id
192 id
1 See WHO, supra note 6.
194 id
1 The BSE Inquiry, The Inquiry into BSE and Variant CJD in the United
Kingdom (2000) at vol. 1, at 226-48, available at http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/
pdf/index.htm (May 3, 2010).
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Kingdom's "competent authority" under EU GFL responsible for im-
plementation of EU food and feed law.19 6 In conformance with the
GFL, the FSA has farm-to-table responsibility for food safety. The
FSA's mandate is to protect "public health from risks which may arise
in connection with the consumption of food (including risks caused by
the way in which it is produced or supplied) and otherwise to protect
the interests of consumers in relation to food."l 9 7 This emphasis on
public health and consumers responds to concern about the role agri-
cultural interests played in the BSE crisis. The FSA relies on risk
analysis in developing regulations, setting strategic planning priori-
ties, and designing inspection regimes. 19 8 The integrity of risk as-
sessment is protected by keeping management responsibility within
the agency and having risk assessments conducted by advisory com-
mittees.199
Denmark revised its food safety law in 2005, adopting a risk man-
agement system that extends from farm-to-table. 200 It uses risk classi-
fication of food establishments as a basis for determining the frequen-
cy of inspections.201 Following EU requirements, Denmark separates
risk management from risk assessment. The Food and Veterinary
Administration, a part of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishe-
ries, is vested with management responsibilities. Risk assessments are
conducted by the Technical University of Denmark.202
In 1996, Denmark launched an aggressive set of farm-to-table
programs of Salmonella control in poultry and hogs.203 This set of
programs is one of the most aggressive examples of what may be in-
volved in farm-to-table risk management of foodborne disease agents.
The goal of the programs was reduction of the prevalence of
Salmonella in poultry flocks and hog herds and the human incidence
of foodborne salmonellosis in Denmark The programs involve exten-
sive testing of animal feed, flocks and herds, carcasses, and meat for
Salmonella using genotyping, as well as intensive surveillance and
genetic characterization of human cases of salmonellosis. Genetic
196 Food Standards Act, 1999, c. 28 (U.K.).
' Id. at § 1(2) (emphasis added).
198 Id. at § 23(2).
' Interview with Derrick Jones, Chief Economist, UK Food Standards
Agency (Sept. 3, 2009).
200 STUART A. SLORACH, FOOD SAFETY RiSK MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND
31 (2008), http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/about-us/risk-management-framework-review/
slorach-report-nzfsa-risk-management.pdf.
201 Id. at 32.
202 Id.
203 Flemming Bager & Christian Halgaard, Salmonella Control Programmes
in Denmark (2002), http://www.adiveter.com/ftp/articles/articulol057.pdf.
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fingerprinting coupled with records on feed and animal movement
allow Danish authorities to trace positive Salmonella tests back
through the supply chain all the way to feed suppliers if necessary. 204
The program has led to a significant reduction in both the prevalence
of Salmonella on Danish farms and the incidence of salmonellosis
human disease. The program was subsidized by the Danish govern-
ment and justified on the bases of both human health concerns and
export promotion. The small scale of Danish agriculture as well as
the existence of a strong farm cooperative system that had a history of
involvement in zoonotic disease eradication contributed to the accep-
tability and success of the program.205 These institutional conditions
may not be common or easily reproducible elsewhere.
Ireland moved to correct both a perception of regulatory capture
by industry interests and fragmentation by creating the Food Safety
Authority of Ireland (FSAI) in 1998, a small agency that functions
largely through contracts. The Department of Agriculture and Food is
contracted to enforce food safety rules governing establishments ex-
porting foods of animal origin or importing products of animal origin.
The Health and Safety Executive is contracted to enforce food safety
requirements in food establishments and on imports. The FSAI relies
on a scientific committee of food safety experts across Ireland to con-
duct risk assessments, develop risk profiles, and provide scientific
advice to be used in risk management decisions.206
Sweden is lqoking into creating a single food safety agency with
farm-to-table responsibility to replace the three agencies now in place.
Currently, the National Food Administration (NFA) is responsible for
import controls and for setting and enforcing rules governing large
meat packers and food processors. It uses a risk classification system
to determine the frequency of inspections and set inspection fees. The
National Fisheries Board and the Swedish Board of Agriculture are
responsible for primary production, and municipalities for overseeing
marketing and small producers. Both risk assessment and risk man-
agement are conducted within NFA, but by different departments.
NFA also relies heavily on outside scientific advisors.207
Outside the EU, different economic and political forces are driv-
ing reform, though they are influenced by developments in the EU
through Codex. In the mid-1990s, Australia and New Zealand agreed
to establish a joint food-standard-setting system to reduce industry
204 id.
205 id.
206 Id. at 33.
207 Id. at 34 .
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44 HELTH M TRI [Vol220:costs and regulatory barriers to trade.208 Reforms to this system in the
early 2000s were motivated by a desire to reduce regulatory burden. 20 9
Additional reforms in the mid-2000s brought the system into greater
conformance with international norms, for example, by separating the
risk assessment and risk management and adopting a farm-to-table
approach.210
The Joint Food Standards Treaty between Australia and New
Zealand adopts a joint system for development and promulgation of
food standards and information sharing. Under this regime, the Food
Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) has responsibility for
administering the food standards code and developing food standards
through a process of public consultation. The standards are to be
based on rigorous science and risk assessment. 211 The Australia and
New Zealand Food Regulation Ministerial Council has final authority
for approval or rejection of these standards and is directed to balance
the objectives of ensuring public health and safety and providing food
efficiently with minimal regulatory burden. Within Australia's feder-
al system, state-level food standards were harmonized under a 1991
agreement. Australia and New Zealand are working to harmonize
standards in many areas of food safety.
The New Zealand and Australian governments are responsible for
setting standards in areas covered by joint standards and implement-
ing and enforcing jointly set standards. The New Zealand Food Safe-
ty Authority has also developed its own capacity to assess and manage
risk using a framework that reflects close coordination with
WHO/FAO and Codex.2 12 Unlike some European authorities, New
Zealand does not institutionally isolate food safety administration
from promotion of agriculture. Slorach conducted an extensive re-
view of the New Zealand framework, including its application to risk
assessment and management of Campylobacter in poultry, aspartame
208 Food Standards Austl. New Zealand, About FSANZ, http://www.food
standards.gov.au/aboutfsanz/ (last visited May 3, 2010).
209 See id.
210 See generally SLORACH, supra note 200, at 27; New Zealand Food Safety
Authority, New Zealand's Food Safety Risk Management Framework (2010),
http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/about-us/RMF-full-document -11604_NZFSARisk
ManagementFramework 3.1.pdf, WHO & FAO, Food Safety Risk Analysis: A
Guide for National Food Safety Authorities, FAO Food and Nutrition Paper 87
(2006), available at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/micro/riskanalysis06
.pdf; FAO & WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural Manual (2008);
Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, Principles and Guidelines for the Conduct of Microbi-
al Risk Management, at 17, CAC/GL-63 (2007).
211 See SLORACH, supra note 200, at 25-31.
212 See Food Standards Austl. New Zealand, supra note 208.
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as a food additive, import safety, mercury in fish, and public concern
about milk safety compared with actions taken in Denmark, Ireland,
213
and Sweden. He argues that because New Zealand depends so
heavily on high-value agricultural exports, food safety is as much an
214economic as a domestic health concern. New Zealand uses a risk-
based approach to the inspection of imports. Risk is defined on the
basis of safety characteristics of food products and other factors. 2 15
New Zealand is moving toward greater reliance on verification of
food safety practices by the importer and less reliance on border in-
spection for lower-risk foods.
A major goal of Canadian food safety reform has been reducing
the cost of government, though recent, well-publicized outbreaks
may affect public confidence in the safety of the food supply. 2 16 The
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) was created in 1997 as an
independent agency that reports to the Minister of Agriculture and
Agri-Food.2 17 This action consolidated food safety responsibilities
that had previously been spread among four federal government agen-
cies.2 18 The Public Health Agency of Canada is responsible for dis-
ease surveillance and participates in outbreak response. 2 19 The Food
Directorate, an independent office within Health Canada, is responsi-
ble for conducting risk assessments for both Health Canada and
CFIA.220 Canada separates standard setting from enforcement with
standard setting conducted by Health Canada and enforcement by the
CFIA. To provide a check on the apparent conflict of interest posed
213 See SLORACH, supra note 200, at 44-61.
214 Id. at 35.
215 id.
216 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EXPERIENCE OF SEVEN
COUNTRIES IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR FOOD SAFETY AGENCIES (2005) (discussing the
reasons different nations formed unified food safety agencies). CNNHealth.com,
Canada Links Toronto Plant to Deadly Listeriosis Outbreak (Aug. 24, 2008),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/08/24/listeria.outbreak/index.html.
217 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Science and Regulation ... Working
Together for Canadians, http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/agenibroch/broche.pdf
(last visited May 3, 2010).
218 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 216.
219 The Public Health Agency of Canada, like the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention in the United States, is responsible for disease surveillance and com-
munications regarding the status of diseases in Canada. See Pub. Health Agency of
Can., About the Agency, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.calabout-apropos/index-eng.php
(last visited May 3, 2010).
220 See Health Can., Food-Related Health Risk Assessment, http://www.hc-sc
.gc.calfn-an/securit/chem-chim/foodrisk-risq_alim-eng.php (last visited May 3,
2010). Health Canada manages the Canadian health care system and monitors health
risks associated with a wide range of consumer products. See Health Can., Food and
Nutrition, http://www.hc-sc.gc.calfn-an/index-eng.php (last visited May 3, 2010).
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by having the agency responsible for promoting agriculture also en-
forcing food safety laws, Health Canada is also charged with evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of CFIA's enforcement programs.2 21 Since 2005,
the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) has been responsible
for initial inspection of food imports. CFIA conducts follow-up in-
spections when CBSA finds questionable shipments. Approximately
two percent of food shipments and the majority of livestock shipments
are inspected by both CBSA and CFIA.222
Current Canadian food safety policy and planning have many
elements that flow from Codex and are common to other national
plans. The Canadian Food and Consumer Safety Action Plan
(FCSAP) calls for a strengthening of a preventive approach to food
safety regulation relying on HACCP and identification of high-risk
foods. Canada currently requires HACCP plans of registered facilities
producing meat, meat products, and fish and seafood products.223
Although the FCSAP does not call for on-farm regulation, it does take
on-farm food safety controls into account in determining "areas of
highest risk."2 24 It uses risk as a criterion for targeting enhanced over-
sight of imports and determining priorities in retail establishment in-
spection, and it looks to risk assessments to help identify high-risk
products. 2 25  The FCSAP also includes strengthening firm-level
record-keeping requirements for use in tracing products should a
problem arise.226 Canada already requires that cattle and sheep bear a
registered ID tag before they can leave their farm. The Canadian Cat-
221 See Health Can., Food-Related Health Risk Assessment, http://www.hc-sc
.gc.calfn-an/securit/chem-chim/food risk-risqalim-eng.php.
222 See FOOD SAFETY, supra note 53 (for a more a more general treatment of
Canada's food import inspection program).
223 See Food Dev. Ctr., HACCP & Regulatory, http://www.gov.mb.ca/
agriculture/fdc/fdcO4s06.html (last visited May 3, 2010).
224 Health Can., Health Canada's Regulatory Modernization Strategy for
Food and Nutrition, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fn-an/pubs/rm-strat mr-eng.php (last
visited May 3, 2010).
225 Id; see also Can. Food Inspection Agency, Canada Has a Robust Risk-
Based Import Control Program, http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/concen/
specif/vegprofse.shtml (last visited May 3, 2010) (explaining the factors the
government of Canada considers in deciding whether a product is high-risk);
Health Can., Risk Categorization Model for Food Retail/Food Service
Establishments - Second Edition, http://www.hc-sc.gc.calahc-asc/pubs/hpfb-dgpsa/
fd-da/riskcategorization-categorisation risques03-eng.php (last visited May 3, 2010)
(describing criteria used to determine the riskiness of food retail establishments in
considering inspection priorities.
226 See ENv'T CAN., FORMATIVE EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL
CONTAMINATED SITES ACTION PLAN: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT (2009), http://www
.ec.gc.ca/doc/ae-ve/2008-09/997/es eng.html.
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tle Identification Agency maintains a database of these registra-
tions.227 Canadian provinces are moving toward traceability require-
ments for food crops as well as livestock. 228
Japan depends heavily on food imports. In recent years, it has
adopted a risk-based approach to import controls. Most food imports
are randomly inspected, and all lots of products deemed to have a high
probability of violation are inspected. Japan bases this plan on the
likelihood of violation as affected by food, firm history, and condi-
tions in exporting countries. Priorities for monitoring food imports
are revised annually in response to changes in risk profiles. 229 Ordi-
nary, random import inspections are free in Japan, but importers must
pay for enhanced inspections as well as for violations of import stan-
dards. This has led many Japanese importers to require testing certifi-
cation from exporters. 230 In the case of serious import violations, the
violators' names are posted on the Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare website. 2 3 1
In many respects, the United States led the way into the current
generation of food safety policy reform. Its efforts were motivated by
serious outbreaks of foodborne illness in the 1990s. 2 3 2 As discussed
above in Section II of this paper, the United States drew on a range of
tools developed for environmental policy and even space programs.
Both the FDA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) began
reorienting their food-processing rules around HACCP in the mid
1990s. 2 3 3 In general, industry and consumer groups have been sup-
227 See Can. Food Inspection Agency, Traceability in Canada, http://www
.inspection.gc.calenglish/anima/trac/traccane.shtml (last visited May 3, 2010).
228 See Ontrace, Traceability Backgrounder, http://www.ontraceagrifood.com/
documents/Traceability/o20Bkgder-Apr/ 2007.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010).
229 See FOOD SAFETY, supra note 53, at 74-76.
230 Id.
231 id
232 See GOLAN ET AL., supra note 5.
233 Nat'l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, U.S. Dep't.
of Agric., Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point System (1989); Nat'l Advisory
Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point System, 16 INT'L J. FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 1, 2 (1992) (expanding upon the
Committee's 1989 HACCP document by emphasizing the concept of prevention,
incorporating a decision tree to identify critical control points, and providing a more
detailed explanation of the application of HACCP principles; Nat'l Advisory Comm.
on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, Generic HA CCP for Raw Beef 10 FOOD
MICROBIOLOGY 449, 449 (1993) (adopting new practices and procedures for beef
slaughter and processing in light of new technologies); Nat'l Advisory Comm. on
Microbiological Criteria for Foods, The Role of Regulatory Agencies and Industry in
HACCP, INT'L J. FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 187, 187-95 (1994); Nat'l Advisory Comm.
on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
Principles and Application Guidelines, 61 J. FOOD PROTECTION 1249, 1249 (1998)
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portive of HACCP's adoption, though both consumer groups and the
GAO have insisted that HACCP needs to be tied to performance stan-
dards, like the microbiological criteria adopted in the EU.234
HACCP was one of the first of many steps the United States has
taken toward more risk-based food safety management.23 5 Through-
out the 1990s and 2000s, substantial technical and policy expertise in
food safety was directed at adapting risk analysis methods and frame-
works to microbiological hazards in foods. Much of the scientific
effort was focused on developing microbiological risk assessment.2 3 6
In recent years, both the FDA and USDA have been using risk profil-
237ing to focus inspection resources and increase their effectiveness.
With recent import problems, the FDA has been looking toward more
risk-based approaches to managing import safety.238  In the United
States, responsibility for risk assessment and risk management gener-
ally lies within a single agency, but responsibility for each of the two
areas is assigned to different work teams or offices within the agency
with interaction to help ensure that risk assessment endpoints are ap-
propriate for risk management purposes. The United States has also
invested in improvements in disease monitoring to provide the infor-
mation basis for risk-based targeting of policy by federal and state
government - most importantly through development of FoodNet, a
nationwide active surveillance system, and PulseNet, which uses ge-
netic fingerprinting in tracing the source of outbreaks.2 39
Given the central role U.S. scientists and technical experts have
played in the development of FAO/WHO guidance, coupled with the
integration of Codex guidelines into the SPS Agreement, it is likely
that the United States will continue to move toward adoption of inter-
(endorsing HACCP as an effective and rational means of assuring food safety from
harvest to consumption).
234 HOLLAND & POPE, supra note 127.
235 For an accessible, but comprehensive introduction to U.S. food safety law,
see NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
(2009).
236 See POST, supra note 76, at 152-58 for a brief history and analysis.
237 Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Risk-Based Inspec-
tion Questions & Answers (2007), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/RBI_Q_&_A
022007.pdf; see Food Protection Plan and Import Safety Action Plan: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, I 10th Cong. (2007) (statement of David Acheson, Assistant Comm'r for
Food Protection of the FDA).
238 Food Protection Plan and Import Safety Action Plan, supra note 237.
239 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't Health & Human Servs.,
CDC FoodNet -Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (Apr. 28, 2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/FoodNet/; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't Health
& Human Servs., CDC PulseNet (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/.
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national norms, whether through statutory or administrative law or
through government-facilitated industry action, such as marketing
orders. 2 40 The United States clearly sees international cooperation on
food safety as not only a means of protecting its trade interests, but
also, more fundamentally, an essential element in protecting the safety
of the U.S. food supply. In addition to its direct involvement with the
Codex committees, the United Sates is engaged in other multilateral
consultations. For example, the Quadrilateral Group, provides a fo-
rum for food safety experts from Australia, Canada, the United States,
and New Zealand to discuss emerging issues and best-practice stan-
dards as they affect the four countries and offers support for shared
interests at Codex sessions.2 4 1
Until recently, the United States has been moving toward a farm-
to-table approach to food safety on a more case-by-case basis than in
Europe, often in response to food safety incidents. After outbreaks of
shiga-toxin E. coli in leafy greens in 2006, which resulted in three
deaths and 200 illnesses, produce growers and regulators worked
together to develop non-binding guidelines for producers of ready-to-
eat produce products.24 2 As a whole, U.S. farmers have resisted
on-farm regulation. As farms consolidate and become more industria-
240 Marketing orders are a system of producer-initiated rules on all producers
of a specific commodity. The rules are designed to overcome coordination problems
that impair the marketability of the commodity. Typical rules include minimum
quality standards, standardized packaging requirements, establishment of reserve
pools for storable commodities, and regulation of the flow of product to market. Only
producers of fruits, vegetables, milk, and specialty crops such as almonds are eligible
to form marketing orders. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and its
subsequent amendments give the secretary of agriculture the power to establish mar-
keting orders. Without this authorization, many of the activities of marketing orders
could be violations of antitrust law. "Federal marketing orders are locally adminis-
tered by committees made up of growers and/or handlers, and often a member of the
public. Marketing order regulations, initiated by industry and enforced by USDA,
bind the entire industry in the geographical area regulated if approved by producers
and the Secretary of Agriculture." U.S. Dep't of Agric., Fruit, Vegetable and
Specialty Crop Marketing Orders, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.O/ams.fetch
TemplateData.do?more=A.OptionalTextl &template=TemplateA&page=FVMarket
ingOrderLandingPage (last visited May 3, 2010).
241 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Quadri-
lateral Food Safety Group, http://www.fda.gov/lntemationalPrograms/FDABeyond
OurBordersForeignOffices/QuadtilateralandTrilateral/Quadrilateral/default.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2009); see also New Zealand Food Safety Auth., NZFSA Profile (Dec.
2007), http://www.nzfsa.govt/nz/about-us/profile/december-2007/index.htm.
242 Miranda Hitti, FDA Sets Fresh-Produce Safety Rules, WEBMD HEALTH
NEWS, Mar. 12, 2007, http://www.webmd.com/food-recipes/food-poisoning/news/
20070312/fda-sets-fresh-produce-safety-rules (describing some of the regulatory
responses to such outbreaks).
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lized and larger scale, and have more direct impact on consumer safe-
ty pressure to regulate them is likely to increase. The United States
already bans feeding offal to cattle and regulates pesticide use on
farms and the nontreatment use of antibiotics. 24 3 The FDA is current-
ly developing proposed produce safety regulations, and the USDA is
evaluating a proposed marketing agreement among fresh produce pro-
ducers. 244 Because each state has two senators, many rural, agricul-
tural states have voting power in the Senate disproportionate to their
population, and thus political resistance to a wholesale regulatory ap-
proach to the farm portion of farm-to-table food safety policy is likely
to remain strong. Conventional wisdom has long held that on-farm
safety rules in the U.S. were more likely to come in the form of self-
imposed marketing orders among producers than formal government
regulation. But the current FDA efforts at establishing produce safety
regulation of farm production may open the way to more on-farm
regulation.
One of the basic structural problems in U.S. food safety regulation
is that responsibility is fragmented among as many as fifteen federal
agencies, states and localities.24 5 Primary federal responsibilities are
243 See 21 C.F.R. § 589.1 (2008). Pesticide use inconsistent with the labeling
is prohibited under FIFRA. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) of 1996, 7 U.S.C. § 136(j)(a)(1)(G) (2006); see Labeling Requirements for
Pesticides and Devices 40 C.F.R. § 156.1 0(i)(2)(2008). Similarly, FDA regulates drug
use on a drug-by-drug basis. Use of antibiotics as feed additives is regulated by the
drug label. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Antimicrobial Resistance, http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/
AntimicrobialResistance/default.htm (last visited May 3, 2010). FDA also has an
educational program on judicious use of antibiotics in feed aimed at preventing anti-
biotic resistance. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Judi-
cious Use of Antimicrobials, http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/
AntimicrobialResistance/JudiciousUseofAntimicrobials/default.htm (last visited May
3, 2010). Legislation has been proposed to strengthen restrictions on use of antibio-
tics in feed as growth promoters. See Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treat-
ment Act of 2009, H.R. 1549, 11Ith Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas
.loc.gov/; Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2009: Hearing on
H.R. 1549 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 111th Congr. 8 (2009) (statement of
Joshua M. Sharfstein, Principal Deputy Comm'r of Food & Drugs, FDA); Chris
Baltimore, Consumer Groups Point to Holes in Cattle Feed Rules, REUTERS, Jan. 3,
2004, http://www.organicconsumers.org/madcow/feedrulesl304.cfn.
244 Preventive Controls for Fresh Produce; Request for Comments, 75 Fed.
Reg. 8,086, 8,087 (Feb. 23, 2010); see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., USDA and
FDA Coordinating Efforts to Assure Safe Product: FDA Invites Public Comments to
Inform Future Rulemaking, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press
Announcements/ucm200965.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).
245 See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Revamping Federal Oversight of
Food Safety, http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/risks/safety-security/food-safety.php (last
visited May 3, 2010).
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placed in four agencies: USDA (meat, poultry, and processed egg
products), EPA (setting pesticide tolerances), Commerce (seafood),
and FDA (all other foods including food additives and economic adul-
teration).246 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
together with state public health authorities, are responsible for dis-
ease surveillance. Local public health authorities and state offices of
public health are jointly responsible for regulating food hygiene in
local food service and retail establishments, assisted by FDA model
food hygiene codes. As discussed above, similar fragmentation drove
food safety reform in the United Kingdom and the European Union.
For close to three decades, the General Accountability Office has ar-
gued for consolidation of federal food safety responsibilities into a
single federal food safety agency.2 47 Despite a recent string of na-
tionwide foodbome illness outbreaks and highly publicized failures of
import controls, however, there does not appear to be the political will
to consolidate. In part, recent difficulties with the formation of the
Department of Homeland Security have raised questions about such
consolidation.248 Current legislative proposals focus on the more li-
mited goal of strengthening FDA food safety authority. 24 9
Discussion has been ongoing about the need for policy reform in
the United States. After more than a decade of reports identifying the
need for fundamental reform of the U.S. food safety system, the GAO
placed the federal food safety system on the high-risk area designation
list.25 0 The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations have all con-
vened senior working groups to develop plans for pushing forward
with reforms. 25 1 At least in broad concepts, the reform agendas of
246 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY
ACTIVITIES: FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE OVERLAP
AND BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d05213.pdf.
247 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED
COUNTRIES' SYSTEMS CAN OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND
RESPONDING TO FOODBORNE ILLNESS (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08794.pdf (citing over thirty years of GAO reports calling for substantial
reform and consolidation of federal food safety agencies).
248 Mimi Hall, Ex-Official Tells of Homeland Security Failures, USA
TODAY, Dec. 27, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/
2004-12-27-homeland-usat x.htm.
249 See Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 875, 111th Cong. § 2
(2009).
250 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD
SAFETY: HIGH-RISK DESIGNATION CAN BRING NEEDED ATTENTION TO FRAGMENTED
SYSTEM (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07449t.pdf.
251 See COMM. To ENSURE SAFE FOOD FROM PROD. TO CONSUMPTION, INST. OF
MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD: FROM PRODUCTION TO
512010]
HEALTH MA TRIX
both administrations reflect the vision for a new generation of food
safety policy that is emerging globally. This is not surprising, as the
United States played a central role in the discussions that helped form
252this consensus.
On July 31, 2009, the U.S. House passed a bill that would make
the first major changes to FDA authority since 1938.253 The bill
addresses only FDA reform. It does not update USDA's meat inspec-
tion statutory authority or address the issue of consolidating food safe-
ty authority into a single agency. The House bill would for the first
time require all U.S. food establishments to register their operations.
It would require all food establishments, not just egg, juice, and sea-
food establishments, to operate under HACCP plans.2 54 For the first
time, compliance with the HACCP plan would be based on meeting
performance standards. 2 55 These provisions have farm-to-table cover-
age.256 FDA inspection resources have eroded and the frequency with
which the FDA inspects establishments has diminished over the past
several decades. The House bill tries to promote more effective use of
inspection resources by using risk criteria in determining FDA inspec-
tion frequency.257 The bill tries to improve containment of outbreaks
by giving the FDA mandatory recall authority and imposing traceabil-
CONSUMPTION app. C (1997) (outlining a preventive, farm-to-table, science-based
food safety system for the United States for Pres. Clinton). Under the Bush Adminis-
tration, a high level interagency panel was convened to address import safety con-
cerns. See INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IMPORT SAFETY, DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT SAFETY: A ROADMAP FOR
CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT (2007), http://www.importsafety.gov/report/actionplan
.pdf. The Obama administration made food safety an early initiative, forming a work-
ing group headed by the secretaries of agriculture and health and human services.
The working group's key findings identify three core principles to guide food safety
reform: preventing harm to consumers as a first priority; developing and using good
data and analysis to guide inspection and enforcement activities; and ensuring rapid
response to outbreaks through establishment of a traceback system. These principles
echo international discussions about the elements of strong food safety governance
systems. See PRESIDENT'S FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP, FOOD SAFETY WORKING
GROUP: KEY FINDINGS, http://www.foodsafetyworkinggroup.gov/FSWG Key
Findings.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010); Jane Zhang, White House Aims to Toughen
Food Safety, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl24696814410505375.html (discussing administrative actions federal agencies are
taking to improve food safety under the Obama administration).
252 See POST, supra note 76.
253 Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 2749, 11Ith Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
254 Id. at §§ 101, 102.
255 Id. at § 103.
256 Id. at § 104.
257 Id. at § 105.
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258ity requirements on U.S. food establishments. It addresses import
safety directly by requiring importers to ensure that their foreign sup-
pliers meet U.S. standards.25 9 And it enhances the FDA's authority to
enforce federal food safety law. 2 60 A similar bill is currently pending
before the Senate. 26 1 The bill is facing substantial opposition from
small-scale agricultural producers because of the provisions that ex-
tend regulation to farm production and a belief that the requirements
would be impracticably burdensome on small-scale operators.262
These concerns point to the need to design policy that works not only
for a wide range of firms, but also for diverse consumer desires.
Whether the bill passes or not, its provisions, as well as the contents
of food safety plans developed by interagency and presidential work-
ing groups, all point toward U.S. adoption of concepts at the core of
the "new generation" of food safety policy emerging across the globe.
CONCLUSION
Despite recent campaigns for more localized food production, the
reality is that for most people in the United States and other developed
countries, their food supply is becoming more globalized. That globa-
lization carries significant benefits for consumers. We are a long way
from the 1920s, when children living in Iowa viewed a fresh orange in
her Christmas stocking as a special treat. But globalization, along
with changes in domestic food processing and production, clearly
raises new challenges to ensuring the safety of the food supply.
The United States is operating under food safety statutes that
remain in large part unchanged since their adoption in 1906. Respon-
sibility for food safety regulation is spread among four major depart-
ments, all of which have other major missions in addition to food
safety. But even in the absence of legislative reform, the United
States has played a central role in the development of an international
consensus on how to modernize food safety policy. This consensus is
"enforced" by economic incentives such as the desire of multinational
food firms to avoid disruption of business and liability and to protect
their brand names and market shares. It is also "enforced" by the de-
sire of national governments to promote their countries' exports. And
258 Id at §§ 107, 111.
259 Id. at § 113.
260 Id. at §§131-135.
261 Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
262 Leah Zerbe, Organic Food Threatened by Pending Food Legislation,
RODALE, Nov. 30, 2008, http://www.rodale.com/food-safety-legislation.
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ultimately, it is enforced by the threat of trade sanctions and by na-
tional law.
The lack of legislative reform in the United States has resulted in
federal agencies attempting to modernize food safety regulation under
the handicap of seriously outdated statutory authority. In the end,
U.S. food safety policy is modernizing, but more slowly and less ef-
fectively than it could with updated statutory authority. This is a good
moment for legislative reform in the United States, not only because
the series of highly publicized failures over the past several years
clearly demonstrates the need for change, but also because decades of
work in this country and abroad have created a clear understanding of
the kind of structure that is needed. At the same time, an independent
mind needs to be brought to the adaptation of international guidance
to U.S. conditions. Just as U.S. case law has been known to go astray
in response to extreme facts, so too have domestic crises in other
countries influenced their laws and their roles in international negotia-
tions in ways that may not provide wise guidance for the United
States. Lessons from comparative law must always be undertaken
with a critical eye.
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